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Abstract: In the last two decades, the economy has
undergone fundamental transformation with the twin
structural changes of a great increase in the size of global
markets and the internet-driven development of a platform
for global exchange and work processes. These changes
have transformed the economic demand for law: the
demand for legal inputs that will support the creation of
value in economic relationships. Not merely the quantity
but the type of legal inputs required by the new economy is
significantly different from those required by the old
economy. The economic demand for law in the new
economy requires support for the much higher rates at
which economic relationships now cross both firm and
jurisdictional boundaries, the more rapid depreciation of
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legal solutions, the increased differentiation of legal
problems, the reduced tolerance for legal transaction costs
created by high velocity and global competition, and a
greater need for integration of business and legal expertise
in order to engage in the relatively constant, innovative
problem-solving that the new economy requires.
In this paper I argue that our legal infrastructure-
the socially available set of legal materials that economic
actors can use to help govern relationships-has not kept up
with this transformation in the economic demand for law.
Empirical evidence for this claim includes the increasing
levels of dissatisfaction in even the most elite corporate
legal markets, the unprecedented impact of the Great
Recession of 2009 on large law firms, and surveys and
interviews conducted with corporate counsel. The primary
basis for the claim of a mismatch, however, is theoretical.
The attributes of our existing legal infrastructure-a heavy
reliance on densely-worded and complex statutes,
regulations and contracts; human-capital-intensive craft
production methods; undiversified legal business models;
almost exclusive reliance on mandatory legal rules imposed
by public actors-are poorly suited to the nature of
economic activity in the new economy. The reason our legal
infrastructure has not adapted, I argue, is attributable to
an even deeper level of legal infrastructure: the severe
limitations on who may produce legal rules and other legal
inputs (such as advice, document templates, norms and
practices) imposed by our continued reliance on publicly
produced rules and the excessively closed nature of our
lawyer- and judge-controlled legal markets.
I. INTRODUCTION: LISTENING TO THE NEW ECONOMY
A few years ago I began asking general counsel at leading
innovative firms about the kinds of problems they faced in getting the
legal system to do what they needed it to do. Where does our existing
legal system help, and where does it hinder, innovative activity, I
wondered? What parts of the legal environment, beyond the obvious
candidates of patent and copyright, were important to the innovative
mission?
The answers I received were striking and not what I might have
guessed. Yes, they complained, like all general counsel today complain
(rightly so), about spiraling legal fees and litigation costs. But their
principal focus was not on the cost of the law they used but rather the
difficulty they faced finding the types of legal help they needed.
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Kent Walker, General Counsel at Google, bemoaned the difficulty
of reducing the reams of wasted paper and effort in managing the
company's contract relationships. "Never, in ten years," he said, "has a
dispute ever turned on the precise language of a non-disclosure
agreement. Yet we still spend lots of time dickering about these
things." In other areas, Walker has tried to bring some rationality to
the amount of paper needed. "But I send them the two pages I think
we need, and they chuckle and send back ten or more." And how, he
wonders, can he give his legal teams the right incentives in contracting
to recognize that sometimes too much legal wrangling or risk-aversion
leads to lost or less valuable deals?
Walker's associate general counsel, Ramsey Homsany, told me
about another problem. When Google acquired YouTube, it was faced
with a massive problem of global regulatory compliance. YouTube
shows up in over loo countries around the globe, each with its own
laws on privacy, intellectual property, defamation, and so forth. How
do you manage a wicked compliance problem like that? Google has
largely developed its solutions in-house. But, Homsany said, "it would
have helped to build on others' experiences and frameworks for that.
We'd like to be able to find someone who's done more than one of
these, who's seen things we haven't seen. But that just doesn't exist
out there across countries and regions. So we have to do it largely
from scratch."
Mitch Gaynor, of Juniper Networks, emphasized a similar
problem with the difficulty of finding integrated legal providers who
can help this smaller (but, at $3.5 billion in revenues, hardly small)
firm to deal with a complex world. "What the market [for legal
services] doesn't seem to understand is that firms like ours are global
from Day One. We have folks working in teams all across the globe the
day we start up." Two examples of the problems this creates are the
following: Gaynor has to turn to a patchwork of providers to figure out
how to make sure he is in compliance with the laws in all these
jurisdictions. And when these far-flung team members-who
collaborate seamlessly over the web in most cases-get on a plane for a
face-to-face meeting and put the software in their backpacks, they face
trade and customs regulations at borders.
Harvey Anderson, of Mozilla Corporation, wrestles with all of
these "transactional frictions." Living in the soup of open-source
software production, he wonders why there are no standards, much
less open-source standards, for the routine repetitive legal elements of
the raft of relationships in and out of which his company moves. "The
business guys work things out and then we all have to stop for a few
hours (or days, or months) while the lawyers haggle over language and
documents that everyone knows will be largely obsolete and unhelpful
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in short order." The problem goes deeper than just squeezing out
some inefficiencies in the drafting of documents. "Our lawyers just
don't know what we do, how a business like this works. There's a
massive DNA gap. I want lawyers who will come spend time here,
getting to know how this business works, what we need and what we
don't. I have a hard time getting outside counsel to take up my offer."
Mark Chandler, General Counsel of Cisco Systems Inc., spoke to
me about how hard it is to find litigation firms that know how to think
about litigation strategy in light of a raft of public and investor
relations concerns. He recounted the story of Cisco's litigation with a
Chinese competitor that Cisco believed had violated its patent rights.
Early in the process his outside litigators recommended filing some
pre-trial motions. Chandler asked if they would win those motions.
The answer from his expert litigators was no, but those motions can
be used to educate the judge about the issues. Chandler's response:
"Don't you guys get it? This lawsuit was all over the news the day it
was filed. When we lose those motions the headlines the next hour
read, "Cisco loses first round to competitor" and the finance guys are
going berserk." Chandler wants a litigation team that has expertise in
thinking about strategy beyond the courtroom.
Even in the world where we might think that traditionally zealous
legal work to protect intellectual property would be a gold-plated
product, I found mismatches between what firms need from their
lawyers and what they can buy. Jonathan Anschell, General Counsel at
CBS Television, recounted the difficulty of finding lawyers who do not
walk into every meeting on a new venture saying, "Are you sure you
want to do this? It's very risky."
"What they don't seem to understand," Anschell said, "is that we
have no choice but to move forward. These markets are fluid, they're
changing all the time and we can't afford to be hanging back waiting
for the uncertainties to shake out. What we need are lawyers who
know how to think about how to manage risk, not avoid it." Take what
you would think would be an easy problem for a lawyer seeking to give
CBS what it wants: drafting terms of use for CBS content online.
Surely the answer is to put out a set of terms that locks up CBS's
ownership over its content? Not so, says Anschell:
We need lawyers who understand that in the world of
new media if you lock it down, you don't get the kind of
user-generated content that is such an important
component of the new media. But when we tell lawyers
that, they come back with the polar opposite-a set of
terms that is a user's dream but a content-provider's
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nightmare. We need something in between these two
extremes, but we find it very hard to locate the
providers who know how to think about that.
What is going on here? While hardly a scientific sample, these
anecdotes should surprise us. These are not small, cash-strapped
businesses that are scraping the bottom of the barrel of legal talent;
they are some of the biggest firms in the country with multi-million
dollar legal budgets and access to the best and the brightest the legal
world has to offer. Why can they not buy what they need?
In this paper I argue that the reason innovative general counsel
are having difficulty finding the legal resources they are looking for is
that law has not kept up with the environment in which they reside.
The world has been fundamentally transformed over the last two
decades. The fall of the Berlin Wall presaged political developments in
the former Soviet bloc, India, and China that, by bringing nearly forty
percent of the world's population out from under a communist
economic regime,' markedly increased the number of countries
participating in global markets during the 1990s. Global Internet-
based technologies have rearranged production, distribution, and
innovation through outsourcing and flexible global supply webs.
For the first decade of these changes, economists focused heavily
on the productivity gains generated by investments in the form of
physical capital, specifically computers. Some critics of the view that
the semiconductor had produced a dramatic transformation in the
economy akin to the Second Industrial Revolution and the invention
of electricity and the internal combustion engine, pointed out that the
productivity gains of the 1990s came almost exclusively from the
dramatic declines in the cost of computing power, with few
productivity gains, if any, experienced outside of technology sectors
and durable goods manufacturing.'
1 LESTER THUROW, FORTUNE FAVORS THE BOLD: WHAT WE MUST DO TO BUILD A NEW AND
LASTING GLOBAL PROSPERITY 27 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, Computers and Output Growth Revisited:
How Big is the Puzzle?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACrIVITY 273 (1994); Stephen
D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 199os: Is Information
Technology the Story?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 2000, at 3.
3 See, e.g., Robert J. Gordon, Does the "New Economy" Measure Up to the Great
Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. OF ECON. PERSP., Autumn 2000, at 49. But see Stephen D.
Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 199os: Is Information
Technology the Story?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. Autumn 2000, at 3.
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But as the second decade of the transformation progressed, it
became clear that the combination of information technology with
dramatic increases in the global reach of the market economy had
produced not merely substantial cost-savings in production, but a new
platform for economic activity. By 2006, the National Academy of
Sciences recognized that the productivity gains associated with
information technology arise not merely from reductions in the cost of
conventional production methods, but from a reconfiguring of how
business is conducted:
Structural changes arise from a reconfiguration of
knowledge networks and business patterns made
possible by innovations in information technology.
Phenomena, such as business-to-business e-commerce
and Internet retailing, are altering how firms and
individuals interact, enabling greater efficiency in
purchases, production processes, and inventory
management. Offshore outsourcing of service
production is another manifestation of structural
changes made possible by new information and
communication technologies.4
While the National Academy simultaneously noted that we have
few hard measures with which to assess claims about increasing use of
new business models such as off-shoring, outsourcing, and global
supply chains,5 a picture of what the "new economy" looks like is
clearly building. That picture is one of a web-enabled and globally-
networked economy that is knowledge-based, transaction-driven, high
velocity, highly fluid, highly differentiated, emergent-and
increasingly hard to predict.
I argue in this paper that law has not kept up with these economic
transformations and that the reasons are deeply structural. More
precisely, they are infrastructural. Although we have recognized the
need to build up new physical infrastructure to support economic
transformation-for example, the fiber-optic cables and wireless
4 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'LACADEMIES, MEASURING AND SUSTAINING THE
NEW ECONOMY: SOFTWARE, GROWTH AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: A REPORT OF
A SYMPOSIUM xvi-xvii (Dale W. Jorgenson & Charles W. Wessner eds., 2006).
5 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, MEASURING AND SUSTAINING THE
NEW ECONOMY: ENHANCING PRODUCTVITY GROWTH IN THE INFORMATION AGE 10 (Dale W.
Jorgenson & Charles W. Wessner eds., 2006).
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transmitters that connect Internet servers and devices-the need for
new legal infrastructure has been almost entirely overlooked. But
legal infrastructure-by which I mean the legal resources available to
individuals, organizations, and regulators to help govern
relationships-is critical to support and regulate the transformations
of the new economy. Legal infrastructure provides important
intangible connections-invisible bridges-between consumers,
suppliers, investors, innovators, and regulators. It includes the formal
rules produced by courts and legislators but, more importantly, it also
includes the knowledge, practices, norms, and resources of legal
practitioners: the solutions and advice provided by lawyers; the
procedures of courts and arbitrators; the contract templates stored in
public and private databanks; the shared beliefs about liability risks
and optimal strategies; the accumulated wisdom and biases of
experienced advocates and adjudicators, educators, and negotiators.
Collectively, these legal resources translate formal rules into actual
behavior and decision making by economic actors. They feed into the
critical exercise of predicting and managing the content and behavior
of economic relationships. Will a new product be threatened by
liability claims from consumers or former employees or current
collaborators? Will uncontrolled production levels threaten global
climates and future economic prosperity? How costly will it prove to
comply with regulatory requirements? Are the commitments from co-
venturers or investors reliable? How will gains from trade be shared?
Who will have access to our ideas before we recoup our investments?
Will we make it from "here"-a new product idea or strategy for
expansion-to "there"-profitability and growth, prosperity and well-
being? If the legal infrastructure is weak or outmoded, the journey
from "here" to "there" will be slower or more costly; we may not get
there at all.
When Cisco's Mark Chandler says he has trouble finding litigators
who can devise strategy informed not only by expertise in how courts
behave but also how investors and the media behave, he is pointing
out a missing bridge. Walker of Google and Anderson of Mozilla are
complaining about the deep potholes they encounter with the
contracting practices of today's transactional lawyers-the ones who
think we need fifty custom pages rather than five off-the-shelf ones to
support a commercial relationship. Gaynor's efforts at Juniper
Networks to manage a global team of employees or Google's efforts to
deploy a global product are hampered by the inefficient maze of
disconnected toll-roads created by a legal profession balkanized across
specialties and jurisdictions. Anschell of CBS is puzzling over how to
get to the equator on roads that only go to the poles. They are all
struggling with outdated and crumbling legal infrastructure, poorly
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adapted to providing them with the installed (legal) capital base on
which they can build their innovative products, processes, and
business models.
In what follows I look at how and why our legal infrastructure is
outdated and ill-suited to serving the needs of the new economy. Fast-
paced, global, niche-driven, and increasingly network- rather than
firm-based, the economy today is poorly served by legal markets and
institutions developed to meet the demands generated by an economy
based on standardized mass-market manufacturing, predominantly
domestic markets, and production organized within, rather than
across, firm boundaries. Today's legal infrastructure, I argue, is too
slow, cumbersome, and complicated (and hence too costly) to manage
the explosion in the number and heterogeneity of legal relationships
and regulatory settings that characterize today's global web-based
entities, facing shorter product (and strategy) lifecycles and fluid
business models.
Although many contemporary observers of the legal profession,
viewing in particular the extraordinary stress generated by the
recession of 2009, have emphasized the need for current legal practice
to become more cost-effective through disaggregation or
organizational restructuring (particularly downsizing) of law firms,6
the key problem, I claim, goes much deeper into the nature of the
solutions that our legal infrastructure offers and is attributable to our
excessive reliance on non-market methods of producing legal
resources. These methods leave law-on the books and in practice-
disconnected from the on-the-ground realities of a dynamic global
economy. In the system developed over the last century, legislatures
and government bureaucracies produce almost all of the legal rules
and regulations governing the economy. These rules and regulations
are interpreted, elaborated, and implemented by judiciaries and juries
according to procedures developed by lawyers and judges. The
practices and expertise of legal practitioners are honed within the
bounds of an insulated profession that faces little competition,
controls access and education, and determines what, where, and how
legal goods and services can be offered.
6 See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregation ofLegal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2010);
Larry Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 749 (2010); William D.
Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis ofLateral Lawyer Trends from
2000 to 2oo7: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1395 (2009).
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While these may be appropriate methods for producing the
political elements of law-the elements that govern the rights and
processes of democratic communities-they are poorly adapted to
producing the essentially economic inputs that legal infrastructure
supplies to entrepreneurs and enterprises, consumers and regulators.
Markets are better than lawmakers at figuring out how to tailor and
manage a complex set of relationships at lower cost with higher
predictability and a better fit with private and public objectives.
Markets are far from perfect and need appropriate structure to coax
solutions that serve not only business but also public goals. But they
are essential instruments in information processing and problem-
solving in dynamic and differentiated settings-the world in which we
now live.
In Section II, I analyze how the new economy is transforming the
economic demand for law-not merely by altering the quantity of legal
inputs required to support economic activity, but more significantly,
by altering the type of legal inputs required. In Section III, I introduce
the concept of legal infrastructure and consider the evidence that
suggests there is a substantial mismatch between what is being
demanded of law and what law is actually providing. This evidence
includes reports of high levels of client dissatisfaction with legal
services, even among those corporate clients who can command the
best the market has to offer; indications of unprecedented dislocations
in legal markets wrought by the recession of 2009; and the interviews
I conducted with general counsel in leading innovative firms. I then
examine the dominant characteristics of modem American legal
infrastructure. In Section IV, I argue that a principal reason for our
legal infrastructure's failure to respond adequately to meet the
demands of the new economy can be traced to an even deeper level of
legal infrastructure-specifically the legal rules and institutions that
govern how legal inputs are produced. These rules and institutions
render the production process for law excessively public and insulated
from market pressures and thereby prevent the adaptation of our legal
rules. Section V provides concluding observations.
II. THE NEW ECONOMY AND ITS TRANSFORMATION OF THE EcONOMIC
DEMAND FOR LAW
In a modern market democracy, law performs many functions. It
secures a reduction in violence and generates social order. It protects
rights and the achievement of democratic goals such as fairness,
equality, and autonomy. It promotes substantive human aims such as
the alleviation of suffering or sustainable energy use. And it structures
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and regulates a market economy. Here I will focus on this economic
function as distinct from the political or democratic functions.7 Even
more specifically, I want to focus on how the attributes of the new
global web-based market economy change what is needed from law in
order for it to fulfill its economic function-promoting economic
productivity, innovation, efficiency, and fair distribution.
From the vantage point of its economic function, we can think of
law as a supply of relational services-economic inputs that produce
value by helping to structure and regulate relationships among
economic actors and between economic actors and communities.
Contracts, for example, supply commitment services, establishing a
basis for confidence that an economic counterpart will act in a
particular way in the future, thereby supporting the incentive to
cooperate with and rely on that counterpart. Property rules establish
boundaries on the resources that can be secured for private use and
those that must be shared with others, establishing the basis for
claims to the value created by resources. Liability rules create
relational claims on the resources of others to distribute losses.
Securities regulations supply information and obligations that support
the willingness of investors to participate in a broadly-based and
largely anonymous set of transactions. Employment laws adjust for
bargaining inequalities that may shift too many of the costs and too
few of the benefits onto workers. Environmental regulations overcome
the implications of free-rider relationships that threaten to produce
too many of some goods (such as consumer products and travel) and
too few of others (such as open space and clean air).
The economic demand for law is thus a demand for legal inputs
that will support the creation of value in economic relationships. The
demand may arise to secure private benefits such as supporting
commitment in a strategic alliance or achieving cost-effective
regulatory compliance. Or it may arise to secure public benefits such
as internalizing pollution externalities or overcoming collective action
7 For other discussions of this distinction, see generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of
Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953
(2000) (exploring the economics of the market for lawyers and evaluating reasons for the
high cost of legal services); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The
Growing Economic Cost ofProfessional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 6o STAN.
L. REv. 1689 (2008) (examining the economic, as opposed to social or political,
implications of self-regulation of the legal market, particularly on services to corporate and
other business entities); Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private
Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 414-15 (2006) (evaluating
whether it would be efficient for the economic functions of law, rather than the democratic
functions, to be provided by private, rather than public, entities).
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problems in maintaining quality or interoperability standards. In the
former case the demand is likely to find expression through market
actors. In the latter case, demand is expressed through actors who are
at least in part coordinated through collective entities such as trade
associations, community groups, public interest organizations, and
governments.
Law is obviously not the only source of economic relational
services. Commitment services, for example, are also supplied by
social norms of trust and market responses to a reputation for
reneging. The motivation to participate in collaborative innovative
problem-solving-as Yochai Benkler, among others, has
emphasized 8-arises not only from the economic incentive of a
property interest secured by patent or copyright but also from
generalized reciprocity, repeat play incentives in markets or networks,
fellow-feeling, curiosity, and the satisfaction obtained from peer
recognition of the quality of an idea or solution. But, as researchers
have discovered in the open-software setting, for example, even
systems that rely heavily on non-economic incentives and norms
depend on some measure of legal structure-such as the creation of a
legally-recognized organization capable of defending the commitment
to democratic governance and commons-based copyright licensing
terms.9 Even with an expanded scope for exchange based on non-
economic norms, a robust market economy clearly demands
substantial legal structure to address the basic issues posed by
economic cooperation and exchange-commitment, risk-allocation,
cost and value sharing, dispute resolution, and so forth.
Transformations in the economy are transforming the economic
demand for law by shifting the structure of economic relationships
and, hence, the problems actors need to solve in order to achieve their
private and public goals for economic cooperation and exchange.
8 See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguins, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.
J. 369, 375-8o (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase's Penguins]; Yochai Benkler, Sharing
Nicely: On Shareable Goods and The Emergence of Sharing as a Modality ofEconomic
Production, 114 YALE L. J. 273, 276, 278-81, 321-27 (2004) [hereinafter Benkler, Sharing
Nicely]; YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 91-99 (20o6). See also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume's
Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 963, 963, 998-looo (2009).
9 For a discussion, see Siobhan O'Mahony, Guarding the Commons: How Community
Managed Software Projects Protect Their Work, 32 RES. POL. 1179 (2003); Siobhan
O'Mahony & Beth Bechky, Boundary Organizations: Enabling Collaboration Among
Unexpected Allies, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 422 (2008).
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These transformations are best seen if we compare two stylized
pictures: the prototypical "old" economy firm and the prototypical
"new" economy firm. I do not claim that all firms ever have or ever
will match these stylized pictures; rather, my claim is that by focusing
on these stylizations, we can see more clearly how what the new
economy needs from law differs from what the old economy needed. I
turn to these stylized pictures next.
A. WHAT'S NEW ABOUT THE NEW ECONOMY?10
Start with the old economy. The old economy is the managed
economyn that emerged at the turn of the last century, spurred by the
technological advances of electricity, national railroads and telegraph
systems.12 It is characterized, in Alfred Chandler's account, by the
large managerial enterprise engaged in mass production on a national
level.13 This is an economy marked by standardization and massive
returns to scale in production, the world of General Motors, U.S. Steel,
AT&T, and, eventually, IBM. It is an economy of consolidation and
vertical integration, the absorption of economic activity in entire
industries within the walls of a handful of, maybe even a single,
corporation. It is an economy built on the establishment of large-scale
capital markets and the separation of ownership and control. Though
engaged in international trade, it is nonetheless a national economy.
In large measure it is governed at the federal level by agencies and
1o There is a diverse literature across economics and sociology that attempts to capture the
elements of the "new" economy. For other discussions, see David Audretsch & A. Roy
Thurik, What's New about the New Economy? Sources of Growth in the Managed and
Entrepreneurial Economies, 10 INDUST. & CORP. CHANGE 267 (2001); Timothy J. Sturgeon,
Modular Production Networks: A New American Model ofIndustrial Organization, ii
INDUST. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2002); Richard N. Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The
Changing Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism, 12 INDUST. & ORG. CHANGE 351 (2003);
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff & Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies:
Toward a New Synthesis ofAmerican Business History, 1o8 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
REVIEW 404 (2003); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor
Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTER. & SOC'Y
388 (2004).
11 Audretsch & Thurik, supra note 10, at 267.
12 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 53-58 (1977).
13 Id. at 486. See also ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990) (examining the growth of "managerial capitalism"
globally).
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statutes beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887)
and the Sherman Act (1890), aimed principally at containing the
abuse of monopoly power.
The prototypical old economy enterprise is a large, integrated
firm-schematically we can represent it as a box; as economists we
represent it as a black box. Inputs from suppliers such as raw
materials, intermediate goods, labor, and financial capital come across
the boundary of the firm, are transformed internally via a production
process into goods and services, and then sold across the boundary of
the firm to buyers. As captured by the work of Ronald Coase and
Oliver Williamson, transactions that cross the boundary of the firm
are managed by contract; those within the firm are managed by
hierarchical fiat and managerial discretion.14 The firm effectively owns
and controls the entire production process taking place within its
walls: research and development and product innovation occur within
the firm; decisions about how much to invest in technology and how
to allocate capital and labor to different aspects of production occur
within the firm; distribution and sales mechanisms are controlled
within the firm. Moreover, there is scale and stability in the firm's
choices about the optimal allocation of inputs, the optimal level of
technology, and the optimal pricing and distribution of products. We
can talk meaningfully about the production process, output, and
pricing decisions of the firm, treating each as stable over a significant
period of time. Technological change is capitalized in the choice of a
durable production process. Regulation of the firm's activities in the
old economy is largely exercised at the boundaries of the firm-
limiting size, taxing output, ensuring competitive or fair terms in
employment and sales contracts, controlling cross-border flows of
physical goods, and so on. The representative firms are national
manufacturers like GM and DuPont, producing and selling the great
majority of their output domestically.
In contrast, the "new economy" begins with twin structural
changes that have made economies fundamentally global. The first is
the extension of world markets into the former communist or
otherwise closed economies of the Soviet Bloc and Asia, notably China
and India. Political changes culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, India's economic reforms in the wake of near-bankruptcy in
1991, and China's fifteen year progression to membership in the
14 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); OLIVER E.
wILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 3
(1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Organization: A Primer, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV.
131 (1996).
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World Trade Organization in 2001 dramatically increased the scale of
world trade and economic activity. As Lester Thurow noted, until the
transformations of the last two decades, nearly 40% of the world's
population lived under a communist economic regime.s The impact of
opening markets continues to accelerate. Domestically, imports and
exports have almost tripled as a share of U.S. GDP since 1970, from a
little over lo% to almost a third of all goods and services purchased or
produced in the U.S.16 Worldwide, total trade has increased
significantly: the average share of country GDP attributable to
exclusively domestic production was nearly cut in half in just a seven
year period (1998 to 2005), from 25% to 14%.17 In the same time
period, total foreign direct investment globally grew by 22%.18 The
number of treaties almost doubled, from 292 to 583.19
The second structural change that transformed national into
global economies was the explosion of information technology, and
specifically the Internet. Worldwide, Internet users as a percentage of
domestic population grew from an average of 7% in 1998 to 29% in
2005.20 Even more striking, in the same time span, the percentage of
countries21 with Internet usage rates below lo% fell from 70% to
25%.22 In 1998, usage rates higher than 30% were rare (5% of
countries)-the top rate was 40% (Norway).23 By 2005 usage rates
above 30% were common (40% of countries) and the top rate was 76%
15 Thurow, supra note 1, at 27.
16 BuRuu OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NAT'L ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, NAT'L INCOME AND PRODUCTS
ACCOUNTS (NIPA) TABLE 1.1.10,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=14&ViewSeries=NO
&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=1970&L
astYear=2009&3Place=N&Update= Update&JavaBox=no# Mid (last revised Jan. 27, 2012).
17 The Globalization Index, 163 FOREIGN POLICY 68 (2007) (These data are based on 72
countries representing 97% of world gross domestic product and 88% of world
population).
18 Id. Data for 1998 were adjusted to 2005 dollars.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 The Foreign Policy globalization data for 1998 is based on 62 countries, accounting for
approximately 82% of world population.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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(Sweden).24 (Usage in the United States grew from 30% in 1998 to
66% in 2005.)25
These structural changes, collectively described as "globalization,"
are transforming the organization of innovation, production, and
distribution in fundamental ways. The Internet is not merely a means
of communicating; its "Web 2.0" version is also a platform for
organizing work.26 With shared databases; videoconferencing;
networking sites with upload capabilities for video, documents, and
images; peer-to-peer networks; collaborative tools such as wikis; and
virtual meeting spaces such as chat rooms and online meeting
facilities, the economy is becoming increasingly Internet-based, not
merely in terms of transactions, such as sales, but more fundamentally
in terms of how work is organized. Thus the globalization we are
witnessing is not just an expansion in conventionally conceived
international trade in goods; it is a restructuring of production
processes across national boundaries. Employees and contractors may
be located anywhere and work together in a virtual space. Drawing on
cloud computing the computer infrastructure of a corporation can be
located anywhere. Services and goods connected to local production
and distribution systems, can be delivered anywhere.
In the new economy, the prototypical economic enterprise is no
longer a box; it is a network. Its boundaries are increasingly indistinct.
As a consequence, production and distribution are much more heavily
influenced by network externalities than at the old economy firm,
where the economies of scale and scope dominated. In the new
economy enterprise, the transaction, rather than the firm, is
primary27-and not merely, as Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson
first emphasized, to determine the boundaries and behavior of the
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Tim O'Reilly, publisher of O'Reilly Media and sponsor of what many think was the first
conference under the banner of "Web 2.o" defines it as "the business revolution in the
computer industry caused by the move to the internet as a platform." Tim O'Reily, Web 2.0
Compact Definition: Trying Again, O'REILY RADAR (Dec. 10, 2oo6),
http://radar.oreilly.com/archives/2oo6/12/web-2o-compact.html. It does not involve any
new technology for connection but rather a shift in how the technology is deployed.
27 Luigi Zingales, In Search ofNew Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623 (2000); Richard N.
Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism, 12
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 351 (2003).
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firm.28 Yochai Benkler and Don Tapscott, with their accounts of
citizen-reporters updating on Slashdot or YouTube, NASA click-
workers mapping craters on the moon, thousands of independent
software engineers writing code, and far-flung geologists collectively
discovering gold, have both painted vivid portraits of the capacity in a
web-based economy to break productive activity down into potentially
minute components or transactions and then network those
components to produce economic output.29 These transactions might
be organized by and between identifiable firms, but they might also
generate a completely independent, self-organizing, and emergent
entity. Similarly, the characteristics of what is produced by the new
economy enterprise can be emergent (bottom-up) rather than
designed (top-down).30 The characteristics of social networks
demonstrate this-Facebook and YouTube have characteristics
invented by their users, not their planners.
The new economy enterprise is also heavily focused on the
production, exchange, and control of information as a good in itself,
not merely as a parameter of production choices. The introduction of
information technology has accelerated the reach and impact of the
transformation in production methods spurred initially by the advent
of "lean manufacturing" and specifically the importance of
information flows between engineers, line personnel, sales staff, and
so on to reduce down-time, decrease required inventories, and
improve coordination.31 Today these methods are seen in deeply
integrated electronic relationships in a wide variety of industries,
28 R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
29 Benkler, Coase's Penguins, supra note 8; Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra note 8;
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 8; DON TAPScOTr & ANTHONY D.
wILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006). See
also DON TAPScoTr & ART CRANSTON, PARADIGM SHIFT: THE NEW PROMISE OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1993); DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND
PERIL IN THE AGE OF NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE (1997).
30 For discussions of Web 2.0, user-led and open innovation, see ERIC VON HIPPEL,
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005), HENRY W. CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE
NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (2005), JOHN HAGEL
III & JOHN SEELY BROWN, THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE EDGE: WHY BUSINESS STRATEGY
DEPENDS ON PRODUCTIVE FRICTION AND DYNAMIC SPECIALIZATION (2005).
31 JAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T. JONES & DANIEL Roos, THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD: THE STORY OF LEAN PRODUCTION Vii, 115 (1990).
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many of which cross the boundaries of the firm.32 With deep inter-
firm integration of information systems comes deep inter-firm
integration in innovation, production, and distribution.33
Unlike the stable old economy firm-the one that conventional
economics can safely treat as having chosen a production process,
output level, and price-the new economy firm is fundamentally
flexible and dynamic. It has to be to respond to a high velocity and
high novelty environment. Speed of response and, more generally,
change across markets is partly a result of how quickly information
travels about the shortcomings of a new product or the potential for a
different partner, business model, or production process. It is also a
result of the expanded stage on which competition takes place-with
more minds competing to solve the same problem or differentiate
products. Some of the speed-up in work is attributable to changes in
expectations about how quickly tasks can be completed-the bane of
the beeper and the Blackberry. Some is due to improved logistics in
shipment and delivery, which allow for shorter times to market.34
Some is due to the modular transaction-driven organization of
economic activity, which implies that there is greater potential for a
piece of a production process or distribution system to shift without
requiring that the economics justify a change in the whole. And
technology makes speed possible and sometimes unavoidable:
Internet connections are always on. Somewhere the markets are open.
Bloggers never sleep. As a result, the new economy firm is called upon
to constantly evaluate and respond.
The new economy enterprise is also involved in a much more
highly differentiated set of products, processes, and relationships than
the old economy firm. Mass-market consumer goods are still with us
32 The phenomenal success of Walmart, for example, is significantly attributable to the
information systems Walmart implemented to exchange information read from check-out
scanners, and soon smart shelves and goods with RFID tags, directly between retailer and
supplier. Justin R. Watkins, Comment, Always Low Prices, Always at a Cost: A Call to
Arms Against the Walmartization ofAmerica, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 267, 273-74
(2006) (citing JOHN DICKER, THE UNITED STATES OF WAL-MART (2005) and DON
SODERQUIST, THE WALMART WAY (2005)) (explaining how "Walmart, Inc.'s tremendous
success in the retail and grocery markets has as much to do with its use of technology as its
maniacal devotion to everyday low prices.").
33 For a discussion, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting
for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 209 COL. L. REV.
431 (2009).
34 MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD SMALLER
AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (2006).
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but so too now is the "long tail" of niche markets,35 facilitated by
global online markets and lower-cost logistics and delivery systems.
Product heterogeneity also results from the global diversity of buyers.
On the supply side, increasing returns to knowledge generates
heterogeneity among economic actors: specialization becomes
indispensable as the level of expertise needed to comprehend an
aspect of a technology, business environment, or transaction
increases. This also means that accomplishing economic tasks often
requires assembling a team of contributors with different areas of
expertise36 and relationships in the new economy frequently involve
parties with substantially different levels of specialized knowledge.
Vertical hierarchies in the organization of work may be collapsing, but
horizontal differentiation is building.
In summary, where the prototypical old economy enterprise is
fixed and stable-with identifiable boundaries-the prototypical new
economy enterprise is dynamic and fluid, its boundaries indistinct.
The old economy firm trades products across its boundaries-inputs
from suppliers, outputs to buyers-and is regulated at its boundaries.
The new economy firm is deeply networked and highly integrated at
the transaction level with a web of suppliers, consumers, regulators,
investors, researchers, and so on. The old economy firm is domestic.
The new economy firm is global. The old economy firm makes its
decisions in a relatively stable and insulated environment, with
uncertainty coming in the form of exogenous shocks. The new
economy enterprise makes its decisions in a constantly changing and
open environment; uncertainty is pervasive. The old economy firm is
planned; the new economy enterprise is reactive and emergent. The
old economy firm is a box; the new economy firm is a network. The
old economy firm is GM; the new economy enterprise is Google.
B. How THE NEw ECONOMY Is TRANSFORMING LEGAL DEMAND
The changes associated with the new economy are transforming
the demand for law. I mean by this more than a straightforward
increase in the volume of legal work as a result of the expansion of the
35 CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTuRE OF BuSINEsS Is SELLING LESS OF
MORE (2004).
36 For an analysis of this implication of technological progress, see Benjamin F. Jones, The
Burden ofKnowledge and the 'Death ofthe Renaissance Man': Is Innovation Getting
Harder?, 76 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 283 (2009).
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scale and complexity of the global market economy. 37 What the new
economy enterprise needs from law is not just more of what the old
economy enterprise needed; it needs things that are different, such as
less complex and costly ways to secure a complex fluid relationship.38
When I speak of the transformation of legal demand, then, I am
speaking of the ways in which the services law is called upon to
provide are altered by transformations in the underlying relationships
law structures. It is in this sense that the new economy demands not
merely more but different from law, at both the level of the
transaction and the level of the market. In this section I identify
several distinctive features of the economic demand for law in the new
economy.
1. INCREASED FIRM BOUNDARY-CROSSING
The relationships of the new economy cross the boundary of the
firm far more frequently than was the case in the old economy. 39 This
transforms the role of contracting. Although I know of no formal
efforts to count this, there is probably an absolute increase in the
number of contracts when functions within the firm are disaggregated
37 See Marc Galanter, Planet oftheAPs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 53
BUFF. L. REv. 1369 (2oo6). Galanter estimates that between 1978 and 2003, expenditures
on legal services (including in-house and government services) grew more than four-fold,
from approximately o.5% of GDP to approximately 2.25%. Gross receipts of U.S. law firms
increased 649% from $22.15 billion in 1967 to $166.1 billion in 2002 (both figures in 2000
dollars.). Id. at 1378-79.
38 For related work examining the impact of decentralization in economic relationships on
the contractual relationships of the new economy, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
Contractingfor Innovation]; Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Braiding: The Interaction ofFormal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and
Doctrine (Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper, Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Gilson,
Sabel & Scott, Braiding], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/So13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1535575.
39 See Gilson, Sable & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38, at 494-501; Bengt
Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.
AUTUMN 1998 at 73, 80, 84-86 (1998) (noting that "there seems to be something of a trend
today toward disintegration, outsourcing, contracting out, and dealing through the market
rather than bringing everything under the umbrella of the organization" and providing a
number of examples); ANNA DUBOIS, ORGANIZING INDUSTRIAL ACrIVITIES ACROSS BORDERS
4 (1998) (observing that "[tihere appears to be some consensus that there is an increasing
move towards 'buy' rather than 'make"').
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and contracted-out and as the number of entities with which the firm
collaborates increases. But even if the count of contracts is
unchanged-if every outsourcing contract in the new economy
enterprise, for example, is replacing an employment contract in the
old economy firm-the complexity of the contracting problem and the
demand for contracting services clearly increases dramatically when
transactions are shifted across the firm boundary. Employment
contracts are relatively thin and standardized, addressing largely risk-
insulated compensation issues but leaving much of the authority to
control the employee's day-to-day activity to the employer's
discretion. The commercial relationships that substitute for
employment relationships when economic activity shifts across the
firm boundary, in comparison, are likely to be far less standardized
and to involve more extensive attention to the evolution of behavior
and information exchange. They are likely to attempt to coordinate
expressly among transactions that within the firm are coordinated
through managerial discretion. As Ron Gilson, Chuck Sabel, and Bob
Scott have emphasized, they are likely to attend to agreements about
goals and information-sharing-as opposed to express behavioral
constraints4o-as they attempt to structure a fluid and dynamic
collaborative relationship.41 All of this entails a deepened demand for
the legal inputs that structure contractual relationships.
2. INCREASED JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY-CROSSING
The demand for contracting inputs is further deepened when
many more relationships also cross jurisdictional boundaries.
Although the managerial economy of the past century also involved
extensive international trade in manufacturing inputs and final goods,
the globalization of the new economy significantly increases the extent
to which economic activity flows across borders, often in intangible
ways. Jurisdiction-crossing relationships are generally subject to
greater uncertainty in enforcement under current institutions and
methods, such as the determination of which laws apply to the
contract, the diversity in legal procedures in different legal systems,
and the complex rules governing when foreign orders (to seize assets
to enforce a judgment, for example) come into play. Moreover, cross-
border transactions acquire complex, hard-to-judge legal elements
when they involve extensive exchanges of information and
41 Id.
40 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 38.
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collaboration on product development and integrated logistics. More
complex legal questions make variation in the legal procedures and
principles in different legal systems a source of greater heterogeneity
and uncertainty in predicting the content of legal obligations.
Jurisdictional boundary crossing also increases the complexity
and heterogeneity of regulatory relationships. Web-based
collaboration among employees scattered across the globe implicates
employment and tax regulation by multiple jurisdictions in hard-to-
disentangle ways, as well as trade and immigration issues when team
members travel to meet in person. Globally available products and
services delivered over the internet-such as YouTube, Firefox,
Google, or eTrade-simultaneously enter multiple regulatory
environments governing consumer transactions, advertising,
intellectual property, privacy and so on. Databases that collect and
providers that host data from several countries, located in servers in
several (perhaps other) countries, and accessed by users in several
(perhaps still other) countries are subject to numerous, often
conflicting database regulations.
3. MORE PERVASIVE AND COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS IN INFORMATION
In the new economy information is a prime object of economic
transactions, but transactions in information are especially difficult to
structure. We have had a patent and copyright system in place for a
long time to create markets in information embodied in inventions
and creative outputs. But in the new economy much of the
information economic actors value is intangible, process-related, or
difficult to capture in a meaningful time frame in patentable or
copyrightable subject matter. Much of the information traded in the
new economy is thus managed relationally, across firm boundaries,
using secrecy, and trust, tort, or trade secret liability (as opposed to
property) to create the potential for trade and contracts to exchange
information for value. Arrow's paradox captures the key contracting
challenge in such an environment: it is very difficult to price
information prior to disclosure and after disclosure it is very hard to
make someone pay for the use of the information in the absence of
external protections.42 There is therefore a pervasive demand for legal
solutions that can protect and price information. Massive data capture
and processing technology-think Google-also raises the legal
42 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615
(National Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962).
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challenge of structuring micro-transactions in information: this is a
key component of the privacy concerns generated when entities such
as Facebook extract commercially-valuable information from the
aggregation and correlation of millions of users' every mouse click.
And even when information transfer is not the direct object of a
transaction, pervasive information asymmetries in an information-
dense environment raise pervasive contract design challenges. The
scope of these asymmetries is multiplied many-fold as transactions
change context across both firm and jurisdictional boundaries.
4. RAPID DEPRECIATION AND OBSOLESCENCE OF LEGAL SOLUTIONS
The higher velocity of the new economy implies that particular
legal solutions have a higher rate of depreciation and obsolescence.
Rapid technological change and more fluid transactional relationships
that are responsive to shifts in competitive advantage on a global scale
can make a particular contract, compliance or regulatory strategy
outdated within a shorter period of time than was the case in the more
stable and slower-moving managerial economy. This expands the
demand for legal inputs as the number of points at which legal
analysis and problem-solving are potentially required increases. It
also shifts the relative value of adaptable as opposed to fixed
solutions, calling for greater emphasis on dynamic as opposed to static
legal analysis.
5. INCREASED DIFFERENTIATION OF DEMAND
The greater degree of heterogeneity in the new economy also
implies a more differentiated demand for legal solutions-although
not necessarily a demand for more differentiated legal documents or
regulations. This arises from the customization of products or services
themselves, higher rates of experimentation with different types of
relationships, and the heterogeneity of legal settings encountered by
global shifting relationships.
6. LOWER TOLERANCE FOR LEGAL TRANSACTION COSTS
Even old economy firms can find legal transaction costs to be too
high relative to the value delivered. But new economy firms are likely
to have even lower tolerance for legal transaction costs because of
multiple pressures. To begin with, enhanced global competition can
decrease profit margins. Moreover, the small-scale startups and
entrepreneurs who play a greater role in the innovation economy face
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greater limits on their ability to absorb legal costs. Structurally, the
fact that new economy firms are in more settings that require
contractual and regulatory compliance analysis and creativity, with
greater heterogeneity and more rapid depreciation of particular
solutions, implies effectively that firms need more but can afford to
pay less. Compare, for example, the tolerance for contract drafting
costs that attends the design of a sales contract or a human resources
employment policy when these solutions can be standardized,
implemented firm wide, and expected to work effectively for a long
period of time, with the tolerance for those same costs when there is
no such thing as a standard product, employee teams are spread
across ten countries, and nothing is expected to remain the same for
very long.
7. GREATER DEMAND FOR INTEGRATION OF
LEGAL AND BUSINESS EXPERTISE
As the number, complexity, and heterogeneity of legal
relationships in which a firm is involved increases, so too does the
value of legal inputs that are expertly informed about the firm's
business goals and environment. In an economy with high levels of
standardization, we can expect legal solutions to effectively capitalize
knowledge about the business or regulatory considerations that, for
example, a sales contract or employment policy needs to address.
Individual lawyers do not need to understand as much about why the
standard approach includes this clause or that practice. But the lawyer
who is designing a contract or practice for a novel or niche setting
needs to understand more deeply the relationship between a
particular solution and the environment in which the client firm or
regulator is operating. Similarly, the lawyer who is trying to predict
how legal relationships will evolve over time or how they will interact
with other legal relationships or legal institutions (such as courts or
regulators) requires, in a more complex legal environment, greater
knowledge of the economic environment, because the conventional
judgments that are capitalized in legal norms and cultures will be less
accurate.
III. MEETING LEGAL DEMAND: THE INADEQUACY OF
OUR LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The legal materials available to meet the economic demand for law
include the set of legal rules and principles in a given setting-the
forms of property that are recognized and protected against theft or
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unauthorized use, the regulatory limits on economic activity, the
elements required to create a binding contract, and so on-but they go
far beyond the set of laws on the books. They include, for example:
* The formal and informal elements of procedure
for invoking or challenging the enforcement of
rules-such as civil procedure and evidence
codes, as they are in fact implemented on the
ground.
* The norms and practices of legal advising, and
the costs and quality of legal advising.
* The standard forms and collected contract
templates available in legal databases, and the
procedures and rules that govern access to
those databases.
* The accumulated conventional wisdom about
regulatory and dispute-resolution strategies.
* The stock of knowledge accumulated by legal
practitioners through formal education, trade
publications, conferences, patterns of training
and expertise, and anecdotal experiences.
These features of the legal environment influence the cost and efficacy
of any particular legal solution that might appear on the books, and
they affect the likelihood of learning about and deploying such a
solution. They are inputs to an economic output, namely the
structuring of a particular economic relationship.
The set of materials or inputs that are deployed in developing
solutions to legal problems make up what I call our legal
infrastructure. This infrastructure provides the base on which the new
economy enterprise, and its regulators, must build solutions to the
challenges of achieving the public and private goals of economic
activity in a rapidly changing world. In this section I first develop the
concept of legal infrastructure and characterize the dominant
elements of our legal infrastructure. I then defend the claim-drawing
on some empirical evidence, but mostly theoretical argument-that
our existing legal infrastructure is inadequate to meet the transformed
legal demands of the new economy.
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A. THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Like other uses of the concept of infrastructure, I intend by legal
infrastructure to refer to a form of socially available capital that
produces a stream of services at a cost lower than the cost of
producing the asset itself. By socially available, I mean that it is (more
or less) widely available to participants in a society, not merely to
those actors who produce the asset. The boilerplate that accumulates
in repeated contracts and is picked up by lawyers drafting instruments
for their clients, for example, is an element of legal infrastructure. The
more widely available that boilerplate is, and the better adapted it is to
achieving the goals of later users, the more valuable it is as
infrastructure. The experience an attorney accumulates in negotiating
regulatory positions with a federal agency is also an element of legal
infrastructure, as are the professional norms for how best to manage a
client seeking to achieve particular goals. Differences in legal
infrastructure are evident as we move around the globe-lawyers in
Germany, for example, are likely to draw up shorter contracts than
American lawyers for a similar transaction; in doing so they draw on
differences in accumulated documents, experiences, practices, and
procedures.43
Note that this notion of legal infrastructure goes beyond the
content of formal legal rules to include the various things produced
privately by the legal effort exerted by lawyers, legal publishers, legal
educators, and legal consumers. It also includes the more informal
products of formal lawmakers such as regulators, legislators, and
courts. Legal infrastructure is thus the accumulated stock of what
legal actors-broadly defined-produce. It is largely a by-product of
performing legal work for a particular economic relationship.
Individualized work becomes capitalized in a durable mechanism-
shared experience, documents, patterns of procedure, and so on-and
thereby socially available in the sense that it contributes value to the
structuring of future, often completely unrelated, relationships. Legal
inputs are thus intermediate goods: they are the output of the legal
sector and used as inputs in other sectors.
The concept of infrastructure here is related to, but distinct from,
the concept of "social capital." Sociologists and political scientists have
varying definitions of "social capital" but they tend to converge on the
idea that there are resources embedded in social relationships and
43 See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with
Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 889, 889 (2004).
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networks-concrete resources, such as information about job
opportunities, and intangible resources, such as trust and norms of
reciprocity-that support the achievement of individual or cooperative
objectives.44 I conceive of legal infrastructure as a set of resources that
can perform a similar function-supplying contractual obligations to
support reliance, for example-but distinguish it from the set of
relational resources derived from extra-legal norms and materials. In
practice, it will of course often be difficult to discern the boundary
between legal and extra-legal resources-between trust and contract
for example.45 But there is a distinction and it is helpful to maintain it
in order to focus on the resources generated by a recognizable legal
system. These too might be informal norms-an informal norm of
compliance with a contract obligation even when the threat of formal
court enforcement is not credible, for example-but they are clearly
linked to the distinguishing features of what we call law.
Like the classical forms of physical infrastructure-highways,
railways, electric power grids, telephone lines-and the critical
infrastructure of the information economy-the Internet-legal
infrastructure "lies beneath" the economic relationships it helps to
structure. It also displays most of the distinctive features of
infrastructure:
* Embeddedness. Infrastructure is sunk into, or
inside of, other structures, social arrangements
and technologies.
* Transparency. Infrastructure is transparent to
use, in the sense that it does not have to be
reinvented each time or assembled for each
task, but invisibly supports those tasks.
44 For discussions of the concept of social capital and its development, see Pierre Bourdieu,
The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION 241, 248 (John G. Richardson ed., 1985); James S. Coleman, Social Capital in
the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AMER. J. SOC. S95, S98, Sioi (1988); Alejandro Portes,
Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 1
(1998); Robert Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life, 13
AM. PROSPECT 35 (1993); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
45 And indeed as Ron Gilson, Chuck Sabel and, Bob Scott have recently argued, the two
may be deeply interdependent. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 38.
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* Reach or scope. This may be either spatial or
temporal-infrastructure has reach beyond a
single event or one-site practice.
* Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-
grantedness of artifacts and organizational
arrangements is a sine qua non of membership
in a community of practice. Strangers and
outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target
object to be learned about. New participants
acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects
as they become members.
* Links with conventions of practice.
Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by the
conventions of a community of practice.
* Embodiment of standards. Modified by scope
and often by conflicting conventions,
infrastructure takes on transparency by
plugging into other infrastructures and tools in
a standardized fashion.
* Built on an installed base. Infrastructure does
not grow de novo; it wrestles with the inertia of
the installed base and inherent strengths and
limitations from that base.
* Becomes visible upon breakdown. The
normally invisible quality of working
infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks:
the server is down, the bridge washes out, there
is a power blackout. Even when there are back-
up mechanisms or procedures, their existence
further highlights the now-visible
infrastructure.46
46 Susan Leigh Star & Karen Ruhleder, Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design
and Access for Large Information Spaces, 7 INFO. Sys. RES. 111 (1996).
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Unlike classical physical infrastructure such as railways, however,
legal infrastructure is not an engineering project that can be designed
and built by a public or quasi-public entity to meet projected demand.
It has some engineered elements-most notably, the formal laws and
regulations enacted by legislatures and agencies, but these engineered
elements are only a small part of what is fundamentally an organic
and emergent entity.47 Most of what constitutes the set of legal
materials available to support an economic relationship forming at a
point in time is the uncoordinated product of myriad legal actions-
contracts drafted, legal arguments made, decisions reached, strategies
tested-taken by a wide diversity of actors at an earlier point in time.
Using the concept of "infrastructure" to characterize the wide
variety of tangible and intangible inputs that law and legal actors
provide to support the creation of value in economic relationships
allows us to draw on the visual imagery of a publicly provided network
that connects individuals, entities, and systems in order to facilitate
their interaction. Highway systems, telephone cables, the Internet-
these familiar components of infrastructure enable A to deal with B. A
society with good infrastructure provides this backbone for interaction
as a public or quasi-public good (possibly charging access fees or tolls)
to the economy at large. Similarly, the legal infrastructure that exists
at any given time in a society provides potential legal connections that
can facilitate or increase the value of economic relationships between
members of the society. A robust legal infrastructure is one that is
well-adapted to meeting the needs of the economic relationships
actors seek to form, providing these relational services with cost-
effective levels of quality.
B. MISSING BRIDGES AND ROADS:
THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
One of the characteristic features of infrastructure is that it is
largely invisible, until it breaks down-at which point it rapidly shifts
to figure from ground: the bridge collapses, the lights go out, the
garbage collectors go on strike.48 Here what we see is the absence of
something we have come to take for granted. Documenting
shortcomings in existing infrastructure-not the bridge that goes out
47 Newer forms of infrastructure, notably the Internet, also display this organic and
emergent quality. For example, analysts of cyberinfrastructure increasingly emphasize the
relational quality and development of this infrastructure. See id. at 112-13.
48 Id.
28 [Vol. 8:1
HADFIELD
but the roadway that was never built-is much more difficult; even
more so when the nature of the connection is as yet uninvented,
maybe even as yet unimagined. Prior to the deregulation of the airline
industry, for example, no one had predicted the hub and spoke system
that quickly emerged after deregulation.49 No one before 1978 would
have been able to demonstrate empirically that what was missing in
air transportation infrastructure were the elements of a hub and spoke
system. Similarly, no one can predict what will replace Google
searches five years from now but we will not be at all surprised to
discover that something will and that there will be elements of cyber-
infrastructure that are now missing or underdeveloped.
It is thus a tall task to demonstrate that our existing legal
infrastructure is inadequate and failing to meet the demands of the
new economy. Certainly there are no, and probably can be no, formal
empirical tests of this proposition-just as there are no tests of the
alternative hypothesis (that many participants in the legal system
likely maintain) that the system is responding well, as well as can be
expected, to demand. The evidence we have is largely anecdotal and,
ultimately, rests on appeals to theory. Those who believe the system is
working well emphasize the (uncontested) fact that our best lawyers
are very smart, work hard, and can be hired at fees that our most
successful corporations can afford. They appeal to the competitiveness
of legal markets to support the claim that if there are legal inputs that
new economy enterprises need to support their endeavors then these
legal markets will produce it. My response in this section is, first, to
point to the partial and anecdotal evidence we have of gaps between
demand and supply. I then, in the following sections, shift to my
primary focus to the theoretical reasons we have for believing that
these gaps exist and are significant.
C. DISSATISFACTION WITH LEGAL MARKETS
Grumbling about law and lawyers is nothing new. But as Marc
Galanter has documented, although lawyers have long been vilified,
dissatisfaction with lawyers and the legal system became widespread
49 See Elizabeth E. Bailey, Air-Transportation Deregulation, in BETrER LIVING THROUGH
ECONOMICS 196 (John. J. Siegfried, ed., 2010) (noting that "almost immediate
tr.ansformation of airline networks from linear point-to-point systems created by the CABG
into hub-and-spoke networks" was an "unanticipated aspect of airline deregulation").
Thanks to Preston McAfee for this example.
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and increasingly hostile beginning in the 1970s and 1980s.5o Much of
this dissatisfaction is found among those who are (or perceive
themselves to be) the targets of legal enforcement-such as the
doctors who spearheaded the tort reform movement beginning in the
mid-1970s.51 But increasingly, dissatisfaction has extended to those
who arguably command the best law has to offer: the large corporate
clients who secure the services of the largest and most prestigious law
firms, populated with elite law graduates.52
Some of the dissatisfaction with legal markets expressed by
corporate clients is undoubtedly driven by the substantial increases in
legal costs over the past decade. Total receipts in law firms rose a
whopping 32% in nominal terms, roughly 15% adjusted for inflation,53
in just five years between 2002 and 2007.54 The California Bar
Journal recently reported "a survey by the Corporate Executive Board
found that large-company spending on law firms grew by 49 percent
between 2002 and 2005."55 Much of this increase appears to come
from increasing fees, not hours. Although reliable industry-wide data
on average hourly rates is hard to come by, there is some evidence that
hourly rates in top law firms have been increasing at roughly this rate
since the late 199os. Firms reporting data to the American Lawyer
Magazine (which generates the AmLaw 200) indicate that between
1999 and 2005 the average "low" billing rate for partners and
associates increased 18-20% in real dollars; the average "high" billing
rates increased 28-30%. And the Corporate Executive Board survey
50 MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2002); Marc
Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TExAS
L. REv. 285, 292-300 (2002).
51 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATILE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 30-31 (2004).
52 Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in America: The View from the Joke
Corpus, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2234 (2002).
53 Inflation adjustment made using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Calculator.
Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services: Geographic Area Series: Comparative
Statistics for the United States (2oo2 NAICS Basis) 2007 and 2002, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN
2oo7_US54A2&prodType=table (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
55 Diane Curtis, Will a Bad Economy Force More Changes in the Profession?, CALIFORNIA
BAR JOURNAL, Jan. 2009.
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noted above also found that "while non-law firm costs increased by 20
percent over the past 10 years, large law firms' prices jumped almost
75 percent in the same period." Average profits per partner increased
50% in real terms from 1999 to 2005.56
The cost of legal procedures is also increasing rapidly. The advent
of e-discovery, for example, is driving up the cost of litigation. In one
estimate, revenues to e-discovery firms were $2.7 billion in 2007, and
projected to reach $4.5 billion by the end of 2010.57 A senior partner
with a large Los Angeles firm reports that in a recent bid on major
litigation, the bid for e-discovery services was approximately $20
million; the bid for attorney services was $4 million.58 The average
cost of patent litigation where $25 million or more is at stake has
grown from approximately $4 million in 2003 to approximately $5.5
million in 2o09-an increase of almost 40% in nominal terms, 18% in
real terms.5 9 As the Association of Corporate Counsel noted in a recent
publication introducing its new "Value Challenge" initiative, the
"stunning" finding by the Corporate Executive Board that over the
past decade large law firm prices have increased by 75%, almost four
times the 20% growth in non-law firm costs, "confirm[s] the
disconnect most if not all of us have been feeling."6o
The concern about cost and fee increases has recently increased
the pressure on law firms to come up with more cost-effective ways of
organizing work. Mitt Regan and Palmer Heenan, for example, have
recently explored the pressure on large law firms to increase their use
of outsourcing and disaggregation of legal services to reduce costs. 61
56 The American Lawyer Media data is on file with the author. The AmLaw data collection
does not ask for information about what proportion of total hours at the firm are billed out
at the "high" and "low" rates-or intermediate rates.
57 SOCHA CONSULTING, 2008 SOCHA-GELBMANN 6TH ANNUAL ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
SURVEY, http://www.sochaconsulting.com/2o8surveyresults.php (last visited Feb. 18,
2012).
58 Private communication.
59 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009). Inflation
adjustment made using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Calculator. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
6
o ASS'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, ACC VALUE CHALLENGE BRIEFING PACKAGE (2011),
http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getf
ile&pageid=433000&title=ACC%2oValue%2oChallenge%2oBriefing%2oPackage
61 Milton C. Regan Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2010).
2012] 31
I/S: A JOURNAL OF IAW AND POLICY
Whether increasing disaggregation of conventional legal tasks-
outsourcing document production and review and legal research, for
example-will lead to cost reductions is unclear (arguably,
disaggregation of tasks in litigation, for example, with document
review outsourced to armies of junior associates and electronic
discovery vendors has increased, not decreased, the costs of
litigation), 62 but in any event cost reduction alone does not seem to be
at the heart of the deeper problems facing legal markets. As the ACC's
initiative-which includes the development of an index rating the
performance of law firms 63-reveals, the concern with costs bespeaks a
much more basic concern with the value of what legal expenditures
accomplish. 64 As lawyers frequently will point out to their corporate
clients, legal fees are still only a fraction of the value of the deals that
lawyers help to structure or the potential liability risks that lawyers
help firms to avoid. But industry survey data suggests that large
corporate clients perceive a substantial gap between cost and value-
the so-called "value proposition." In the 2009 Altman Weil Chief Legal
Officer Survey, for example, half of the respondents gave a response of
"6" or higher when asked how much pressure, on a scale of o ("no
pressure") to lo ("intense pressure"), corporations were putting on
law firms "to change the value proposition in legal service delivery (as
opposed to simply cutting costs)." When asked how serious they
thought law firms were about changing the value proposition, nearly
three-quarters answered "4" or less. Forty percent said they intended
to reduce their use of outside counsel in 2009-following reductions
of 26% in 2008 and 16% in 2007.65
6 2 The billing of junior associate hours on discovery and due diligence document review, for
example, has spurred some corporate clients to refuse to allow junior associates on their
litigation teams-suggesting that the work has been judged to be of too low value when
completed by disconnected suppliers. Similarly, electronic discovery services seem to have
increased, not decreased, the cost of the discovery phase of litigation. Regan and Heenan
advert to these integration concerns when they note that increasing disaggregation of tasks
requires additional efforts at re-integration into a final product and that lawyers,
traditionally, have not shown expertise in project management. Id. at 2138-39.
63 See ASS'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 60, at 6.
64 See id. at 1.
65 ALTMAN WEIL INC., 2009 CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER SURVEY: THE OPINION OF CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICERS ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE, 5, 11, 14 (2009), available at
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir docs/resource/b842ofda-5d98-42a5-af27-
45aec7c9bl77_document.pdf. The Altman Weil survey is based on 183 responses from
Chief Legal Officers of corporations, 62% of which have annual revenues of over $2 billion;
68% have annual legal budgets (inside and outside counsel) in excess of $5 million.
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Even more telling is a 2006 survey conducted by the BTI
Consulting Group. 66 This survey of 250 corporate counsel at large and
Fortune looo firms (24% of the Fortune loo) found substantial levels
of dissatisfaction with law firm providers. Sixty-eight percent said that
they would not recommend their primary law firms to others; 61% had
replaced a primary firm within the past eighteen months. Until 2005
the one or two firms identified as "primary" accounted for half of a
company's expenditure on outside counsel; that share fell to 30% in
2006. Low satisfaction with performance resulted in companies hiring
more "secondary" firms, increasing from an average of seven firms
accounting for 30% of total expenditures in 2004 to fifteen firms
accounting for 50% in 2006. This suggests significant dissatisfaction
with premier providers. Moreover, the dissatisfaction was not based
on cost but rather on a failure of what the study calls "client focus:"
understanding of, and responsiveness to, the client's needs and
business and a demonstrated ability to help the company achieve its
business goals. As BTI puts it: "True client focus demands the ability
to frame legal issues in [the] context of [the client's] business and
industry."67 Asked what they would advise law firms to do to earn the
company's business, 25% of corporate counsel responded
"demonstrate exceptional client focus." Another 50% appealed to
other factors that reflect an ability to work in a high-value way with
the client. Only 2% cited "lower rates" as the way to earn work. Client
statements in the report emphasize that the problem is understanding
the nature of the client's business circumstances and problems. Law
firms should "develop an understanding of our business and business
strategy and stay focused on those, rather than on legal issues solely,"
said one in-house lawyer at a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical firm; "A
firm with client focus would have awareness of how their advice would
affect the broader business," said another from a Global 500
investment bank.68
Comparable results were recently found in an academic survey
conducted by Michelle Beardslee, John Coates, Ashish Nanda, and
David Wilkins at Harvard Law School. Although not focused directly
on surveying client satisfaction, their study of 166 corporate counsel at
large corporations found that 8o% had reduced the work given to a
66 BTI CONSULTING GROUP, INC., How CLIENTS HIRE, FIRE AND SPEND: LANDING THE
WORLD'S BEST CLIENTS (2007).
67 Id. at 33.
68 Id.
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preferred provider between 2003 and 2oo6; 88% reported that the
reason for doing so was a failure of quality or responsiveness to the
company's needs. Cost was not mentioned as a factor leading to
reductions in work.69
There is reason to think that a failure in the legal industry to
understand and respond to business needs is also behind some of the
stunning changes in legal markets wrought by the recession of 2009.70
Law firms for the first time in 2009 engaged in widespread layoffs of
attorneys, deferred the hiring of entire classes of new law school
graduates, and substantially reduced their recruiting of future classes.
Several firms have announced that they will move away from lock-step
compensation to merit-based compensation models. Although calls
for alternatives to the hourly fee have been around for at least a
decade,71 in 2009 for the first time clients have successfully required
law firms to absorb more responsibility for producing value, with fixed
annual and project budgets.72 Unlike in earlier recessions, when law
firms were effectively recession-proof-able to shift from working on
the transactional matters that boom in good times to the bankruptcy
and litigation matters that (used to) boom in bad times-law firms in
this recession have simply found themselves facing lower demand.
This is consistent with the survey findings reported above indicating
dissatisfaction with the quality of product delivered by legal markets,
and in particular the value of legal work to achieving bottom-line
business objectives.
69 Michelle DeStefano Beardslee, John C. Coates IV, Ashish Nanda & David B. Wilkins,
Hiring Teams from Rivals: Theory and Evidence on the Evolving Relationships in the
Corporate Legal Market, CELS 2009 4TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES PAPER (Feb. 21, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1442066.
70 See Ribstein, supra note 6.
71 See, e.g., Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing
Practices, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 293 (1998) (noting that task-based billing can be
more appropriate in certain circumstances); RICHARD REED, BILLING INNOVATIONS NEW
WIN-WIN WAYS TO END HOURLY BILLING 133-58 (1996); The Corporate Counsel Section of
the New York State Bar Association, Legal Development: Report on Cost-Effective
Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REv. 263 (1995).
72 Pfizer, for example, with an annual legal budget of $1.5 billion, announced in 2009 that it
would no longer pay any of its attorneys on an hourly basis. This followed earlier policies
that prohibited the use of first and second year associates on their matters. See Amy Miller,
No More Baby Steps, LEGALWEEK, Jan. 21, 2010; Nathan Koppel & Ashby Jones, Billable
Hour Under Attack in Recession, Companies Push Law Firms for Flat Fee Contracts,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2009, at A.
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The sense that law providers "just don't get it" was also a pervasive
theme in the small set of interviews I conducted with general counsel
in innovative firms in Silicon Valley in 2006-2007. These interviews
were open-ended responses to the question, "How does the existing
legal system help and how does it hinder innovative activity?" Putting
flesh on the bones of what it means to say that outside legal counsel
lack sufficient "focus" on the client's needs and business, as I
discussed in the Introduction, those I interviewed gave dramatic
examples of what they simply couldn't find in our existing legal
infrastructure. Harvey Anderson of Mozilla put this point starkly:
Our lawyers just don't know what we do, how a
business like this works. There's a massive DNA gap. I
want lawyers who will come spend time here, getting to
know how this business works, what we need and what
we don't. I have a hard time getting outside counsel to
take up my offer.
Kent Walker of Google emphasized the difficulty he faces getting
transactional lawyers-both inside and out-to focus on overall deal
value, and not contract language per se. Lawyers, he notes, are
rewarded for the contracts they complete but not for the deals that
they save or increase the value of by showing restraint in negotiation
and drafting. He can see that some deals, for example, can get by just
fine with only a few pages of contract language; but he finds that when
he sends those few pages to lawyers outside the company or on the
other side, he invariably finds that they send back several more.
Anderson of Mozilla similarly bemoans the transactional frictions
generated by a mismatch between contracting efforts and an
understanding of the business value of contracting.
Some of the misplaced attention to legal detail-beyond what is
required to achieve business objectives-can be attributed to
professional tunnel vision: when all you have is a hammer, everything
looks like a nail. But some can also be attributed to pervasive
difficulties among lawyers when it comes to thinking about business
risks. Examples of this are in the anecdotes Jonathan Anschell of CBS
Television related about lawyers who walk into every meeting on a
new venture saying, "Are you sure you want to do this? It's very risky,"
or who struggle to balance risk and opportunity in drafting terms of
use for online media.
Mark Chandler at Cisco Systems Inc. emphasized a different kind
of disconnect from underlying business realities. His story of Cisco's
litigation with a Chinese competitor demonstrates his difficulty
2012] 35
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
finding a litigation team that can integrate expertise across multiple
areas-litigation, finance, communications-instead of leaving it to
him to integrate these cross-cutting considerations.
There is another form of fragmentation and compartmentalization
in legal services that the General Counsel with whom I spoke
identified as a problem for them. This is the fragmentation of
expertise within law itself across jurisdictional lines. Mitch Gaynor of
Juniper Networks talked about the difficulty he has finding integrated
legal providers to deal with a complex world. Driven by regulatory
limitations on the practice of law that have made each local state or
country bar a monopoly, the market simply does not offer deep
expertise in how to manage compliance in multiple jurisdictions. Even
a mega-company like Google-which at one point was also a "global
from Day One" start-up company too-finds itself unable to purchase
outside expertise in managing wicked compliance problems.
Although the evidence is partial, these survey results and
anecdotes suggest that there are substantial gaps between what our
legal infrastructure is providing and what the new economy is
demanding from law. The problem is not one that can be met through
the kind of cost-reductions that can be squeezed out with outsourcing
or rearrangements of the organizational structure of conventional
legal practice. Reducing the cost of processing millions of documents
by using contract lawyers, cheaper associates, offshore services, or
electronic data analysis can only compress the cost so much; the real
economic mismatch lies with a legal solution that requires review of
millions of documents in the first place. That problem, the problem of
mismatch, lies in the incentive structure facing legal markets and their
capacity to generate significant innovations in the solutions law offers.
A review of the dominant attributes of our legal infrastructure and the
materials it provides for solutions to the legal problems faced by the
prototypical new economy enterprise provides another basis on which
to ground the claim that our legal infrastructure is doing a poor job of
supporting the new economy.
D. WHERE WE ARE TODAY: ATTRIBUTES OF
OUR LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
In this section, I set out the dominant characteristics of our
existing legal infrastructure. In the next section I then explore how
those characteristics impede the ability of the legal system to meet the
economic demand for law in the new economy. Note that my goal here
is not to be exhaustive, and clearly there is diversity in the legal
materials and processes available, even within the U.S. But it is
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possible to develop a stylized snapshot of the legal infrastructure that
a business in the new economy will confront.
1. DOCUMENT/TEXT-BASED RULES
Although I emphasize that legal infrastructure consists of large
quantities of inputs that are not legal rules, rules nonetheless are the
fundamental organizing structure of legal work. And one of the most
salient features of the legal environment for the new economy entity is
that it is awash in a high volume of document-based rules. The
business of an economic entity is affected by local ordinances and by
state and federal regulations and statutes, both domestic and foreign.
These are found embedded in a large set of documents, some but not
most of which will be easily located and searched online. Regulations
can and do cover every detail of how the business is operated:
employment practices, taxes, workplace health and safety, pricing,
advertising, managerial conduct, manufacturing standards,
disclosures to investors, consumers, the government and the general
public, environmental practices, and so on. Another potentially large
set of documents containing rules governing the conduct of the
business will be found in agreements that the business has entered
into: supply contracts, loan agreements, corporate by-laws, investor
deals, partnership agreements, employment contracts, intellectual
property licenses, joint venture arrangements, agreements with
governments or citizen associations, etc. Still further rules-and
essential information for the interpretation of the rules found in other
documents such as legislation or contracts-are found in judicial
opinions from multiple court systems.
In the modern American setting, these documents have distinctive
features, relative to other settings and periods in history. In particular,
the documents tend to be long, highly detailed, and densely worded.
The health care legislation originally proposed in the Senate in 2009,
for example, contained 107,000 words; the House bill 167,000 words.
By way of comparison, the first major piece of federal regulation, the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, contained 58oo words;73 it took
around 15,000 words to spell out a major piece of New Deal
legislation establishing the welfare state-the Social Security Act of
1935;74 and even in the renewed regulatory environment of the 1970s,
73 See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
74 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
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the Clean Air Act required only about 19,ooo words.75 The number of
pages in the Federal Register in 1949 was 19,335; by 2005 the total
had reached 134,261.76 Anecdotally at least it is widely believed that
American business contracts are longer and more detailed than their
European counterparts. 7 Judicial opinions have grown increasingly
lengthy and dense-often footnoted-over the last several decades.
U.S. Supreme Court opinions averaged on the order of 760 words in
18oo and 2,129 words in 1951; today's average is roughly 4300
words.78 In 1960 the average federal appellate court judge produced
86,ooo words a year; by 1993 he or she produced 112,000.79 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which is the premier court
hearing federal administrative cases, went from an average of 5.9
pages per opinion in 1965 to 12.4 pages in 1985.o
The wordiness of the American legal landscape, however, does not
imply that determining the content of legal rules and relationships is
simply a matter of plowing through ever-larger volumes of detailed
text. Equally salient is the fact that the language in legal texts is often
difficult to interpret. This is so for at least two reasons. First, legal
language is esoteric, and indeed, increasingly so. While it has long
been the case that legal language has functioned as a sublanguage
which must be learned and is often not intelligible to lay persons,8'
75 See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
76 John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic
Growth (Dept. of Economics, Appalachian State University, Working Paper No. 09-02,
2009), available at http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp0902.pdf.
77 Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer
Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv, 889, 889 (2004).
78 Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Trends,
Determinants, and Effects of the Length of Majority Opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
45 Hous. L. REv. 621(2008).
79 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 153 (1999).
8o Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1070 (1990).
s1 For a discussion, Veda Charrow, Jo Ann Crandall & Robert Charrow, Characteristics and
Functions ofLegal Language, in RICHARD KITIREDGE & JOHN LEHRBERGER,
SUBLANGUAGE: STUDIES OF LANGUAGE IN RESTRICTED SEMANTIC DOMAIN (1982). The
authors emphasize that the difficulty laypersons have in interpreting legal language (such
as jury instructions) is due not only to the use of specialized vocabulary, but also non-
standard grammar and syntax.
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growing specialization within legal practice82 makes skilled
interpretation of many legal documents the province of only a small
sub-set of lawyers.
Second, legal language is frequently-deliberately-indeterminate.
Interpretation of a legal document is not merely a matter of
communication; it is a pragmatic prediction about the content and
consequences of a legal relationship that will play out in adversarial
settings. Even plain language is subject to creative argument and
reframing; most legal language leaves a significant margin for
different interpretations in context. Interpretation thus depends on a
host of variables beyond linguistics: a body of case law, the likelihood
of being able to produce admissible proof, judicial ideology or
discretion or competence or attention, the beliefs and practices of
other practitioners, etc. It also depends on the unpredictable turns of
reasoning that can arise in a system of open, contestable reasoning
committed to remaining susceptible to a previously unknown
interpretation of, for example, words such as negligent or reasonable
or material.
2. HUMAN CAPITAL-INTENSIVE CRAFT PRODUCTION
Legal services are characteristically provided on a craft model,
where an attorney or team of attorneys evaluates the legal situation
facing an individual client on an individual basis and an individualized
strategy or plan is developed and implemented. Lawyers rely heavily
on acquired experience and personal judgment in assessing the likely
content and consequences of a legal relationship. Research materials
are almost exclusively textual and legal in nature, requiring human-
capital-intensive analysis. There is little systematic and quantitative
data either available or put to use in developing legal advice or
documents. There is little use of automated or computer-based
methods to produce or deliver legal inputs, such as the predicted
effect of different contract clauses or compliance strategies.
The craft model of production results in high degrees of variability
in legal advice and strategy. But it also produces high degrees of
standardization in documents. Standard practice for producing
contract documents, for example, is to mark up (redline) a document
developed for a previous deal or relationship-obtained from a client's
own files, a law firm's shared precedents, or an online database. As a
8 2 John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson, Edward 0. Laumann & Ethan Michelson, The
Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
751 (1998).
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leading guide to contract drafting puts it: "In contract drafting,
plagiarism is a virtue."83 Linguists have described the resulting style as
"frozen."84
All of these features also add up to legal processes that, because of
high human capital requirements, are high cost and generally quite
slow, requiring significant inputs to achieve a result. This is evident in
the review and negotiation of transactional documents; it is even more
evident in litigation.
3. UNDIVERSIFIED PRODUCTION MODELS
The complexity of the legal landscape has contributed to the
increasing levels of specialization in legal practice: few lawyers
involved in providing large-scale business services are generalists, as
they were several decades ago.8 5 This specialization, however, is not
unique to law: increasing specialization is evident in many economic
sectors. What is distinctive about law is the extent to which the sector
as a whole is cordoned off from other economic activity, resulting in a
lack of diversification in both knowledge and financial structure.
With the (important) exception of in-house counsel
(approximately 8-10% of the profession), 86 almost all lawyers work in
all-lawyer environments where they are exposed to the ideas and
problem-solving techniques of people with their same training and
intellectual orientation.8 7 Legal training is largely homogeneous-
lawyers are trained in effectively identical law schools with the same
curriculum and methods. Lawyers have little expertise in industry or
business decision-making and have similar levels of risk-aversion,
particularly as compared to business actors.
A lack of diversification also characterizes the organizational form
in which some eighty percent of lawyers practice: the exclusively
83 CHARLES A. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN'T TEACH YOU
42 (2008) ("A lawyer drafting a contract should always try to start with a form designed for
the kind of transaction involved.").
84 See Brenda Danet, Legal Discourse, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS VOL. 1
273-91 (Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen & Heidi E. Hamilton eds., 1985).
85 See Heinz et al., supra note 82, at 761-62.
8 6 AMElICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2009), available at
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/LawyerDemographics.pdf.
8 7See Heinz et al., supra note 82, at 767-70.
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lawyer-owned and financed law firm.88 Almost all firms have the same
pyramidal structure: senior partners who have direct (and generally
personal and portable) relationships with clients8 9 with lower tiers
filled with more junior attorneys, some on a (shrinking) path to
partnership, others on a contract basis.90 There are few collaborative
enterprises that merge legal expertise with other business expertise.
The business model of the firm must be exclusively financed by
withheld profits and bank loans, cutting innovators off from large-
scale capital markets, private equity, and third-party financing and
insurance. This lack of financial diversification limits the risk-bearing
capacity of the firm, a factor that probably limits the capacity to move
away from per-lawyer effort-based billing (whether based on tightly-
monitored hours, as is the norm today, or loosely guesstimated
"services rendered," as was the norm in the mid-20th century) to
project- or product-based billing. It also may account in part for the
high levels of risk aversion we see in legal practitioners more
generally.
4. MANDATORY RULES
The rules governing the conduct of a company or organization and
available to it for structuring its business dealings are the product of
government actors: legislators, regulators and judges. This means that
a business entity surveying the landscape is not in the market to
purchase rules but rather must largely take them as given. At best, the
business entity can try to influence the public rule production process
through lobbying efforts.
The rules produced by these public actors are by and large
mandatory and which rules will apply to given conduct is not a matter
of choice for the affected entities. There are important exceptions,
however. Actors generally may choose which state law will govern
their contracts, for example. They may choose to have their disputes
determined by a private adjudicator applying consensual rules and
88 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 86.
89 Professional ethics rules adopted in almost all jurisdictions prohibit a law firm from
requiring lawyers to sign a non-compete agreement that would prevent lawyers from
taking clients when they leave a firm. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCr R.
5.6 (1983).
90 See Heinz et al., supra note 82, at 767-70; Marc S. Galanter & William D. Henderson,
The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 6o STAN. L.
REV. 1867 (2008).
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procedures rather than a public judge following mandatory
procedures. Corporations may choose the state of their incorporation,
separate from the choice of where they locate their operations. There
is little scope, however, for choosing which regulatory or liability
regime will apply to business activities, short of controlling (generally
the location of) the conduct that may trigger the exercise of
jurisdiction by a potential regulator or court system.
Once framed, a given legal question is generally subject to the
exclusive authority of only one rule maker, even if that authority is
contested in practice. With the potential for claims to be framed as
legal questions in multiple ways, however, the capacity to impose
mandatory rules on a particular business activity or event is frequently
fragmented and overlapping. Legal claims that impact a given activity
can be stated under multiple federal and state statutes and regulations
or common law: the fact that a federal court has turned away an action
under the federal Sherman Act, for example, does not eliminate the
potential for antitrust actions under state statutes or common law
claims for unfair competition or fraud; a tort decision under California
law does not bind a court adjudicating a tort claim for the same
conduct under New York law.91
E. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
EMERGING LEGAL DEMAND IN THE NEW ECONOMY
We are now in a position to better understand the complaints we
hear in interviews and surveys of corporate counsel. These clients-
with the best chance, compared to government and consumer clients,
of getting what they want from the legal system-are complaining
about potholes, missing bridges, and circuitous routes in the legal
infrastructure on which they depend to obtain results for their
companies. Using the analysis above we can see the reasons to believe
that the problems they are identifying are systematic and widespread,
and not merely the result of blips in their local markets for legal
inputs. In this section I re-visit the problems the general counsel I
spoke with raised in light of what they indicate about the nature of
legal demand in the new economy and the legal infrastructure
available to meet that demand.
91 Robert Kagan presents a detailed picture of how multiple federal, state and municipal
regulatory agencies, along with federal and state courts, generated a tangled web of
litigation and regulatory process that delayed by several years the dredging of the harbor in
Oakland, California to accommodate larger containerships. ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 25-29 (2001).
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Kent Walker of Google and Harvey Anderson of Mozilla both
spoke about the problem of "transactional friction" and in particular
the time and money seemingly wasted on producing what they
perceived as too many and excessively long contracts and other
business documents. While such a complaint may seem mundane,
there is reason to believe that their special emphasis on this is rooted
in the innovative new economy environment in which they operate.
Google and Mozilla are on the leading edge of the explosive demand
for legal support for relationships that cross firm boundaries in the
global networked economy. Moreover, the relationships that cross
these boundaries are far from standardized; although they may well
possess repetitive elements such as the need to protect confidential
information or to make clear the limited scope of a relationship, they
are fundamentally heterogeneous. These are relationships that are
likely to be highly fluid, responding to a high velocity environment,
and dealing with complex and highly uncertain emergent products
and processes.
The lower tolerance for the conventional solution to contracting
problems that Walker and Anderson express is easily understood in
light of the several differences between their legal demand and that of
the old economy firm, especially the prototypical mass-market
manufacturing firm. They cannot afford substantial resources to
develop a new solution for each such relationship and they generally
do not have the scale in individual types of relationships to justify the
investment in detailed individualized contract design. Nor do they
expect the relationship to stay the same for very long, further reducing
the fixed investment they can afford for a given stage in a relationship.
Nor can they be confident about the dimensions of the relational
issues they may face or the capacity to reduce those dimensions to
contractual language that secures expectations; so many of their
relationships are about products and processes that display high
degrees of novelty and constantly-shifting complexity. These
attributes are poorly suited to the conventional contractual
environment Google and Mozilla face. Existing standardized contracts
are ill-suited to the heterogeneity of these relationships and the high-
end craft model of contract customization is too expensive for
relationships that are high volume, constantly evolving, significantly
intangible and complex. The conventional legal response to complex
contracting problems is complex contracting-detailed, expensive, and
dense.92 But as Anderson's musing about open-source contracting
92 For example, Julie Martin, Associate General Counsel at Mozilla, recounted to me
recently having heard about a 70-page document created to structure a $5ooo deal.
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standards reveals, the need is for the kind of simple yet powerful,
elegant, and intelligent solutions that his colleagues in software
development generate to solve their complex programming problems.
The legal infrastructure available to firms like Google and Mozilla,
however, is poorly equipped to respond to their demand for legal
support for their firm boundary-crossing relationships. It offers a
population of providers who rely heavily on replicating prior
documents to produce new documents. This is a process that produces
upward drift in verbiage and contributes to the "frozen" character of
legal documents.93 It is also a process that truncates the development
of expertise in fundamental contract design; today's lawyers are expert
at analyzing and modifying existing contract documents but not at
analyzing the fundamentals of a contractual relationship and
designing a contract from the ground up.9 4 Even if Walker develops an
in-house staff with expertise in simpler, innovative contracts, he
resides in a world of adversarial legal relationships in which providers
on the other side are likely to be wary of the strategic implications of
departing from convention, or who simply have not developed this
alternative expertise. A single provider of a contractual solution
retained by both parties is unheard of (but not unimaginable).
Nor are there providers who can bring to bear the kind of massive
data-analysis that Google itself has innovated for its own products or
the open-source networks that Mozilla generates to churn out
software modules that can be used to perform repetitive programming
tasks. There is no data to which Kent Walker can point to ground his
intuitive judgment that the extra pages or the time that might be spent
tweaking contract language costs a lot more than it is worth, much less
a less human-capital-intensive data-based service that can design the
appropriate legal structure for an exploding set of relationships. If
Harvey Anderson wants to make use of open-source contract modules
that cheaply and intelligently resolve repetitive issues in his
transactions, Mozilla will have to produce those as well.
93 Anna Trosborg, Introduction to Laying Down the Law-Discourse Analysis ofLegal
Institutions, 23 J. PRAGMATICS 1, 1-5 (1995).
94 In addition to the anecdotal evidence of this, John Coates' study of the use of takeover
defenses in IPOs provides systematic evidence that lawyers adopt contract terms based not
on the fundamentals of an economic relationship, but rather on their custom. His data
show that differential adoption of takeover defenses is not explained by underlying issuing
firm characteristics but rather by the practice location of the lawyers representing the firm.
John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001).
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Both Anderson and Walker also point to a deeper and subtler
obstacle to meeting their contracting needs with existing legal
infrastructure, which is what Anderson calls "the DNA gap." By this he
means the relatively low understanding of the nature of his business
that he finds among legal professionals. This is a natural result of the
highly specialized nature of legal practice and the almost cloistered
settings in which it is practiced. The knowledge, culture, and language
that lawyers acquire are the knowledge, culture, and language of law,
not business-this separates lawyers from the other providers of
specialized business inputs such as marketing executives, accountants,
finance people, and product development engineers. This disconnect
starts at the educational level-lawyers in law school, the rest in
business school-and continues for the great majority of lawyers
throughout their careers.
Those who work at in-house legal departments are better equipped
to acquire a deep understanding of the needs and processes of
business entities-but even then, as Kent Walker's comments suggest,
there are substantial limits. Walker notes the difficulty of giving even
his in-house lawyers-who scoot around the playground that is Google
alongside the software engineers and business folks-the right
incentives in contract design. We have the knowledge and systems in
place to reward, and penalize, lawyers for legal results-the contract
that is signed, the lawsuit that exploits an ambiguity in contract
language-but not for business results-the deal that was missed or
made less valuable by too many words or belabored negotiations.
Some of these features appear to induce excessive risk-aversion
among lawyers: it is not just that lawyers are taught to see the
potential problems, it is that if things go wrong ex post because a
contract provision is open to an unhelpful interpretation or missing
entirely, the lawyer is dinged for the failure. This happens even if the
ex ante choice to stick with simple language or less expensive
contracting methods was the right bet to take. But the lawyer is not
easily rewarded for the cases that do not bark and so overreacts to
even small risks of failure. Structurally, because of the organization of
legal work and expertise, lawyers bear the downside risks
asymmetrically with the upside risks of more targeted, cost-effective
lawyering. Better risk analysis requires data analysis-which existing
legal markets do not do-and risk distribution-which limitations on
the diversification of financing and ownership of legal providers
restrict.
Jonathan Anschell's experiences at CBS Television reflect similar
limitations on the nature of the legal inputs CBS can secure from the
existing legal infrastructure. He too talks of a shortfall in what outside
counsel understand about the nature of the fast-moving and
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inherently risky and inchoate deals the company has to pursue. The
fact that even at the highest levels of the corporate bar attorneys are
predominantly oriented to emphasize risk avoidance makes searching
and paying for the exceptional lawyer who has developed expertise in
managing risk in ambiguous settings a burden. Although business
managers no doubt differ in their success in risk management, it
would be striking indeed if risk avoidance were the norm rather than
the exception in that profession.
Lawyers have long been tagged with conservatism, of course. And
a conservative role has long been seen as largely appropriate: lawyers
identify risks; business managers choose which risks they want to take
and how they want to manage them. What is different in the new
economy? To some extent what is new is the scale and centrality of
risk, driven in particular by the importance of knowledge and
innovation,95 and the exposure of so much more of a firm's operations
to the risks inherent in a cross-boundary relationship between
independent actors as opposed to one found within a hierarchy
ultimately governed by fiat from the top. To some extent it is the shift
from quantifiable (and insurable) risk-what will happen to input
prices in this market? Will demand for this (mass-produced) product
continue to grow or decline?-to the unquantifiable uncertainty and
ambiguity generated by high rates of novelty, network connectedness,
more diverse and numerous competitors, and emergent business
models and products. And to some extent what is new, compared to
the more stable, standardized managerial economy, is the
pervasiveness of law-both in private cross-boundary and cross-
jurisdictional relationships and in public multi-jurisdictional
relationships.
Together, these changes make the role of the lawyer one that, to be
valuable, must be immersed in the process of structuring, analyzing,
and responding to an ever-changing relational and regulatory terrain.
Risks in this environment cannot be compartmentalized. The need is
for relatively constant dialogue between legal expertise and business
expertise and, particularly, co-creation of innovative legal structures
to adapt to changing business circumstances and knowledge.
This is what Anschell is also reporting when he describes CBS's
difficulty finding lawyers who know how to design a relational
structure and not merely present a choice between two polar variants
of a terms-of-use agreement: the standard terms that maximize
ownership and control and the standard terms that maximize use and
95 See Audretsch & Thurik, supra note 10.
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access. This disconnect between business needs and what is offered by
legal providers is not (just) attributable to a system based on
adversarial contract development and contract drafting through
replication of prior standardized models. It is the product of a system
that compartmentalizes legal expertise in a world where novelty and
fluidity dominate. If a lawyer does not deeply understand a client's
business model and environment, he or she cannot design a novel
structure that is not just an incremental adjustment to an existing
standard. Nor can the involved business managers innovate a
structure without deep knowledge of the legal tools, limits, and
implications. Just as the creation of an innovative business model for
CBS, Google, or Mozilla must be the product of fine-grained
collaboration between software engineers, marketing experts, finance
experts, and other business professionals, so too must the creation of
an innovative legal structure be the product of fine-grained
collaboration between law and business.Law in a dynamic business
setting must be deeply integrated into the "DNA" of the business
itself,96 and that DNA is wired for uncertainty and risk. The
segregation of legal and business expertise in our existing legal
infrastructure stifles that integration.
Mark Chandler's anecdote about Cisco's litigation with a Chinese
competitor demonstrates another aspect of the frustrated demand for
integration of legal inputs with other professional inputs. In our
existing legal infrastructure it is up to Chandler and his colleagues to
integrate the advice about litigation strategy they receive from top-
notch outside litigators with concerns about the impact of the
96 For similar conclusions, see, e.g., Beverly A. Lyman, Crafting a Patent Strategy in a
Changing Environment, DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY: 2010 EDITION, available at
2010 WL 4466, at *20 ("My advice to business is to integrate the patent lawyer into
business discussion as much as possible... . Patent lawyers cannot be just technically and
legally focused. They must appreciate how the business will be affected and they have to
see the business end of things, how it is going to play out down the road. Business strategy
includes a realistic valuation of what any patent is worth in a changing market. The more
lawyers know, the better they can obtain the best possible results."); Michael C. Cook, Key
Changes in Health Care Law Policies - And Upcoming Responses, THE IMPAC' OF RECENT
HEALTH CARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING CHANGES,
OVERCOMING CHALLENGES, AND ADVISING CLIENTS IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT (2009),
available at 2009 WL 4023554, at *8 ("In the coming years ... [c]lients will place a
premium on lawyers who they can consider to be strategic business partners, who will work
with others to integrate solutions, who can see the big picture of their clients' businesses
and strategies, and who can quickly respond .... This will require understanding our
clients' businesses sufficiently to gauge whether, if you push a button and make a decision
in one area, you can predict and advise how it may affect other areas and also longer-term
implications.").
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litigation on investors, the media, or other strategic goals. But just as
Chandler, who oversees a massive legal department, relies on outside
expertise about litigation strategy, so too would he like to be able to
buy expert advice that integrates litigation strategy with
communications or operations strategy.
The narrowly legal focus of outside counsel could be a sign of an
appropriate division of labor: in-house counsel accumulate and
coordinate the expertise on the business side needed to integrate these
expert legal inputs into an overall business strategy. But what the
general counsel at the innovative firms I spoke to are emphasizing-
what lies beneath the widespread dissatisfaction with the client focus
of outside counsel found in the BTI study-is a demand to shift more
of that integration outside of the firm. That is, the task of integrating
legal advice with business expertise and other strategic considerations
is no longer something that is so easily (if it ever was) done internally.
This is consistent with what we know about the changes in the new
economy: the deepened complexity and novelty of multiple business
decisions-about new products, new partners, new business models,
new finance models-calls for more collaborative participation in
problem-solving from a wide spectrum of experts. Decisions in a
complex high velocity environment are not as easily
compartmentalized. The burgeoning dimensions of business problems
are not additive-they are multiplicative and non-linear. The expertise
has to be delivered around the table, not over the transom. I suspect
the oft-heard complaint about problems with lawyer's
communication97 With their business clients is not the mundane type
of communication that can be solved by providing more frequent
emails and reports. It is the substantive type of communication-are
you engaged in an ongoing and rich conversation with us about what
you think and what we think?
The fragmentation of legal inputs goes even deeper than the
compartmentalization of legal and business expertise. Even within the
legal category, expertise is balkanized. Take Google's issues with
YouTube, for example. To begin with, the regulations governing online
video (obscenity, privacy, copyright, defamation, etc.) are produced in
multiple, separate but overlapping jurisdictions in political and
administrative processes that it can do little to manage. The
conventional method of controlling exposure to regulatory regimes-
control over the geographical distribution of a product-is effectively
97 The BTI study notes that failures in communication are a key reason that relationships
between corporate counsel and outside counsel fail. See BTI CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,
supra note 66.
[Vol. 8:148
HADFIELD
unavailable for a product delivered over the Internet. There are few
mechanisms available for choosing a regulatory regime. So any
solution needs to integrate legal expertise across multiple
jurisdictions. But this exposes the problem to a second form of
fragmentation: legal expertise is sold in geographically segregated
markets. Most countries (and all states in the U.S.) substantially
restrict the provision of expertise about local law to providers
(lawyers) who are admitted to practice locally.98 In-house lawyers
avoid these restrictions, but are left with the task of cobbling together
expertise from individual country experts.
With employees and team members scattered across the globe, for
example, Mitch Gaynor of Juniper Networks faces a
multijurisdictional maze of employment, trade, and customs law. But
the legal infrastructure available to him is composed only of a
"patchwork of providers." Of course any high-end law firm, if you pay
them enough, can pour sufficient resources into digging into multiple
regulatory regimes to give Juniper the answers it needs once Gaynor
has formulated the question. But this is an extremely costly solution,
beyond the reach of the new economy start-up that is "global from
Day One." There is no time to build a large in-house legal department
and no budget for thousands of hours of research and memo writing
by a far-flung army of associates and foreign partners. Moreover the
solution is kludgy and inelegant: it does not offer a way of cutting
through complexity, and instead compounds it. And that is frustrating
in a new economy world where the essence of success is the simpler,
smarter way of getting things done.
Lawyers are not immune to the can-do spirit of competitive
markets. They experience their markets in fact to be quite competitive
and the legal profession's response to claims of inadequacy in the
supply of legal inputs is often, "We can do that, just ask us." The
problem is not that lawyers are lacking in intelligence and the
potential for creativity. It is that solutions generated in the existing
business model-craft-based high intensity human capital deployed in
organizations composed, financed, and managed exclusively by
lawyers-are simply too homogeneous and too expensive relative to
the value they generate. As pushback from even the largest firms
98 For a discussion of how the regulation of lawyers domestically inhibits the development
of integrated cross-jurisdictional legal solutions, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Role of
International Law Firms and Multijural Human Capital in the Harmonization ofLegal
Regimes, in MULTIJURALISM: MANIFESTATIONS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES (Albert
Breton, et al., eds., 20oo), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9 5 94 22.
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indicates, it is too expensive even for the mega-firms like Google and
Cisco. But it is especially true for the high-energy, high-risk, high-
return business activity that typifies the new economy: the innovative
start-up, the experimental joint venture, the emergent network. The
company that, like Juniper Networks, is "global from Day One." Or
that, like Mozilla, is committed to a business-model that fosters non-
market collaboration of the type that Yochai Benkler has
highlighted.99 The legal infrastructure with which these new economy
actors have to work is simply not capable of delivering what is needed.
The solution is not sustainable.
IV. How DID WE GET HERE: SECONDARY LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
What accounts for this state of affairs? Why is our legal
infrastructure-the set of legal materials and tools available to support
and regulate economic activity-so poorly adapted to serving the
needs of the new economy? And if the demand for legal inputs is
fundamentally driven by economics it is reasonable to ask why such a
poorly adapted system persists. The answer lies in understanding that
legal infrastructure is largely an organic entity, produced by the actors
who make up the legal sector. Mismatches in legal infrastructure are
largely a result of even deeper elements of legal infrastructure, what
we might call "secondary" legal infrastructure: the set of rules and
institutions that determines who may participate in producing legal
inputs, and how. (I am intentionally echoing H.L.A. Hart's distinction
between primary legal rules and secondary legal rules-secondary
rules are the "rules for making rules" and in particular the rules of
recognition in a given system that determine what it takes to produce
a valid primary legal rule.)oo
These rules and institutions display two fundamental
characteristics. First, public actors exercise a near-complete monopoly
over rule production. These public actors include legislators, civil
servants operating within administrative agencies in the executive
branch of governments, and judges operating within courts, all of
whom are by-and-large not experts in the substantive areas they
regulate.o1 Second, complementary services that implement formal
99 See supra note 29.
loo H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96, 114 (1997).
1o, All judges are trained as lawyers; many legislators are as well. In 2011, 68% of Senators
and 36% of Congressmen were lawyers. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA CHARTS OF
LAWYER-LEGISIATOR IN CONGRESS, 110TH CONGRESS, available at
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legal rules are provided in legal markets that are among the most
highly controlled and protected in the modern economy. Ostensibly
through state supreme courts and practically through state bar
associations and the American Bar Association, members of the legal
profession (lawyers and those lawyers who have become judges) both
control who may supply legal inputs and the business models that can
be adopted to finance and deliver legal inputs.
My claim is that poorly adapted primary legal infrastructure
persists because our secondary infrastructure-based on publicly-
supplied rules and a closed legal services market-imposes (at least)
two fundamental barriers to entry: it expressly restricts many forms of
supply to conventional and often public providers, and it indirectly
derails innovation by crippling investment of venture capital in
innovation of legal methods.o2
A. EXPRESS SUPPLY RESTRICTIONS
The displacement of costly and poorly adapted legal production
methods in law is directly limited by formal constraints on who may
supply legal inputs. Most of our legal rules can only be produced by
publicly constituted entities. This is true for most forms of intellectual
property protection (trade secret, copyright, trademark, patent),
securities regulation, corporate law, bankruptcy, secured transactions,
environmental regulation and so on. In general, businesses cannot
choose between alternative providers; rules are imposed on a
mandatory basis based on a jurisdictional determination also supplied
by public actors. Where they can choose-as in corporate law, for
example-they are restricted to choosing among public providers,
specifically the states. Private providers-whether profit maximizing
or non-profit-cannot compete for the business of designing a higher
value, more cost-effective set of rules and procedures. And even in
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/publications.shtml [click on U.S. House of Representatives
and U.S. Senate links] (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). Twenty-six out of forty-four U.S.
presidents have been lawyers. Wikipedia, List ofPresidents of the United States by
occupation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-ofPresidents of the United-States by occupation
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). Administrative agencies generally possess expertise but are
heavily constrained by non-expert oversight and rulemaking by legislators and courts.
102 The following is discussed in more detail in Hadfield, supra note 7, and in Gillian K.
Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REG. 40 (2001), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regV24n/hadfield.pdf. For another discussion of
how regulatory restrictions limit adaptation of the Big Law business model, see Ribstein,
supra note 6.
2012] 51
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
those cases in which public rules are supplied as defaults and parties
can devise privately through contract an alternative set of rules, the
terms on which those privately-designed rules will be enforced are
governed by public rules-specifically those of state contract law. This
leaves the private alternative embedded in the public production
process of legal inputs.
But what prevents parties from going a step further and using
state-provided contract law to enforce an agreement to adopt a wholly
different, and privately-provided, mechanism for managing, at least,
their contractual relationships? Particularly in light of the Federal
Arbitration Act-which since 1925 has instructed American state and
federal courts that they must enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate
their disputes in private systems1o3-parties have long been free to
choose alternative mechanisms. Indeed, this is how the trade
associations studied by Lisa Bernsteinio4 operate their private, and
distinctive, contract enforcement systems. Why have such systems not
emerged outside of the prototypical old economy trade association
composed of the buyers and sellers of a single commodity such as
diamonds, grain or cotton?
The fate of even the minimalo5 effort to contract out of the
evidentiary and procedural rules of state court systems through
103 9 U.S.C.A. H§ 1-307.
104 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1770-82, 1818-21 (1996)
(explaining that the National Grain and Feed Association applies a heavily "formalistic"
approach to dispute resolution that does not give much weight to "course of dealing, course
of performance, and usage of trade"); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Basis for Article 2'S
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 723, 725 (1999)
(noting that some merchant arbitrators are often more strict and formalistic in rule
application than the Uniform Commercial Code requires); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1735-37, 1745, 1771-73 (2001) (noting that "the
Code directs courts to look to immanent business norms reflected in course of dealing,
course of performance, and usage of trade, to fill gaps and interpret contracts, and directs
them to take parties' actions under a contract as the best indication of what they intended. .
. . In contrast .. . [cotton arbitrators] use a relatively formalistic adjudicative approach that
gives little explicit weight to elements of the contracting context."); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-30, 135, 149 (1992) (explaining that the diamond industry does rely
heavily on custom and trade usage to resolve disputes).
105 The effort is "minimal" because parties including an arbitration clause in their contracts
by and large do not contract out of state-provided substantive law, only the state-provided
adjudication process.
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private arbitration demonstrates the significant impact of the express
limitations imposed by our secondary legal infrastructure on who can
provide legal inputs. By most accounts, modern commercial
arbitration is increasingly indistinguishable from litigation in terms of
the resources devoted to discovery, evidentiary battles, and procedural
moves.,o6 Arbitration brings some important benefits-confidentiality
and greater party control over the timing of procedures-but early
hopes that the process would routinely dispense with expensive
strategic litigation tactics, where costs on the margin seem clearly to
outweigh benefits, have largely been dashed.
Arbitration, perhaps inevitably, looks like the process that lawyers
and judges have created in public courts because lawyers and judges
still dominate the process. Some of this is due to express arbitrator
qualification requirements imposed by arbitration providers. For
example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (formerly
NASD), whose rules must be approved by the SEC, requires that
arbitrators'o7 in employment discrimination suits be licensed
attorneys.os A leading arbitration provider that advertises that its
1o6 There is little data available to provide a firm basis for this assessment. For anecdotal
accounts, see Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISP.
RESOL. J. 37 (Apr. 2003); Perry A. Zirkel & Andrihy Krahmal, Creeping Legalism in
Grievance Arbitration: Fact or Fiction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 243 (2001);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 95-97, 107-o8 (2000); Yves
Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as States
in a Professional Competition, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 285, 298-99 (1996); Thomas E.
Carbonneau, National Law and the Judicialization ofArbitration: Manifest Destiny,
Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 115, 126, 130 (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Richard B. Lillich & Charles N
Brower eds., 1994) ("There is no doubt, in terms either of practice or prophecy, that
arbitration (international or domestic) is well on its way to judicialization."); Arthur W.
Rovine, Fast-Track Arbitration: A Step Away from Judicialization of International
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 45-47 (Richard B.
Lillich & Charles N Brower eds., 1994). But see Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts Ourselves:
How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Reshaping Our Legal System, 1o8
PENN. ST. L. REv. 165 (2003) (expressing confidence that arbitration has been effective in
other ways, specifically in "creating [] a profound change in our view of the justice
system").
107 Specifically, "chairpersons" who may serve as sole arbitrators or who chair three-person
panels. See FINRA, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES (FINRA
Manual), §§ 12400, 12401, 10212, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display main.html?rbid=2403&element-id=4096.
108 Id. at § 10211. Another example of similar arbitrator qualification requirements is the
California Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program, whereby California allows clients to opt for
arbitration of their fee disputes with their former attorneys through program managed by
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neutrals are required to follow substantive law-the National
Arbitration Forum-requires that its neutrals be attorneys or retired
judges.1o9 But even without express requirements, lawyers and retired
judges clearly dominate the market for arbitrators.110 JAMS, another
leading provider, currently shows a list of neutrals that is almost
exclusively attorneys and retired judges.-
This is no doubt attributable, in part, to the control that lawyers
have exercised over who may represent a party in an arbitration.
Many state bar associations have deemed representation of another
(other than one's employer or partner) before a private arbitration
tribunal as the "practice of law."112 As a result, non-lawyers, and
indeed often out-of-state lawyers, are prohibited from providing
representation.113 A recent Virginia State Bar decision, for example,
held that a Certified Public Accountant who represented a client in
arbitration before the then-NASD was engaged in the unauthorized
local state bar associations. (Attorneys are also permitted to compel clients to participate in
the program when their fee agreement contains an arbitration clause). CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6200 (2010). At least one member of the arbitral panel for this program must be an
attorney with a particular area of practice. Id. at §62oo(e).
109 See The Forum Arbitration Difference, NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM,
http://www.adrforum.com/main.aspx?itemlD=5&hideBar=False&navlD=55&news=3
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
110 Jay E. Grenig & Rocco M. Scanza, Tear Down This Wall! The Case for the Non-Lawyer
Employment Arbitrator, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (2009).
- See JAMS Resolution Centers, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/locations (last visited
Feb. 18, 2012).
112 See, e.g., Rappoport v. Florida Bar, 540 U.S. 967 (2003); Florida Bar re Advisory
Opinion on Non-Lawyer Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 118o
(Fla. 1997).
113 See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2007). Out-of-state lawyers can represent
client in arbitration if the arbitration grows out of representation of client in their own
jurisdiction. See id. California requires certificate filed with California State Bar
Association and local attorney of record. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1282.4. New Jersey
requires an out of state attorney to register with the Clerk of its Supreme Court and
authorize the Clerk to receive process on the attorney's behalf. See New Jersey Comm. on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, Opinion 43: Out ofState Attorney Representing Party
Before Panel of the American Arbitration Association in New Jersey,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/UPLCOpinion43supplementingop28.pdf
(also recommending that AAA arbitrators require as part of filing process that out-of-state
attorneys certify compliance with Rule 5.5, and raising the possibility that lawyer-
arbitrators who fail to do so may be themselves in violation of ethics rules that require an
attorney not assist another in the unauthorized practice of law).
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practice of law.114 A recent opinion from the New Jersey State Bar held
that even out-of-state attorneys (much less non-attorneys) are
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law if they represent clients in
arbitrations, or indeed in mediations, unless the service arises from
their representation of the client in their own jurisdiction and they
have registered with and paid the required fees of the New Jersey Bar
Association.115 Lawyers have thus defined arbitration as a legal process
over which they command regulatory control. With lawyers in charge
of the process, it is not surprising that even if an arbitration provider
or relevant agency (such as the SEC) authorizes non-lawyer
arbitrators, a strong "market" preference will emerge for lawyers and
particularly retired judges to serve as arbitrators.
The obstacle this imposes to the use of private contracting
methods to develop alternative mechanisms for supplying legal inputs
is especially dramatic because any truly innovative mechanism is
likely to emerge organically and incrementally. Significant innovation
is likely to require some initial foothold, some small experimental and
limited use within the framework of an otherwise conventional
method. But those conventional methods are fully controlled and
conceptualized by existing legal providers: attorneys and judges.
B. CONSTRAINTS ON CAPITAL
The limitations on who may provide, and hence potentially
innovate, legal inputs are compounded by constraints that attorneys
have placed on the organizational form and financing of legal
providers. Judges and lawyers in the U.S. have decided that entities
financed by non-lawyers cannot supply legal services to the market-
even if the entity's business model requires that licensed attorneys
actually provide any legal advice or representation to clients.116 This
114 vA. STATE BAR, UPL OPINION 214 (Apr. 8, 2oo8),
http://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/upl-opinion-214 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). The NASD,
now FINRA, rules governing arbitrations, because issued by a self-regulatory body subject
to SEC oversight, must be approved by the SEC. Those rules establish that a non-lawyer
may represent a party in an arbitration unless disallowed by state law. See FILING OF
PROPOSED RULE CHANGE RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES IN ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION, SEC RELEASE 34-55604 (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-55604.pdf.
115 N.J. COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw, supra note 113.
116 The "corporate practice of law" doctrine emerged in New York in 1909. Bruce A. Green,
Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1115,1120 (2000). It is represented in ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUcT R. 5.4,
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eliminates the corporate form as a vehicle for the supply of legal
inputs and cuts legal innovation off from sources of private equity
capital-the angel investments or venture capital, for example, that
finance innovative ventures in other industries and the potential IPO
that motivates them and many entrepreneurs. And, as Larry Ribstein
has recently documented, debt financing contributed to the fragile
financial structure of the high profile law firms that stunned the law
world between 2003 and 2008 by failing.117
These constraints also cut legal innovation off from important
sources of human capital. Non-profit entities governed by non-lawyers
by and large cannot, for example, market different legal inputs to
overcome inefficiencies in the lawyer-dominated model. Architects or
engineers in the U.S., for example, cannot through their trade
association market legal services specifically targeted at improving
value for their industry. They can provide blank forms-so long as
they do not provide any legal advice about how to fill the form in or
which form to choose,118 but they cannot set up a subsidiary to serve as
a law firm to industry participants. Nor can innovative lawyers who
recognize the need to incorporate methods that fall outside of the
traditional model of law look to non-lawyer software engineers,
systems analysts, management consultants, accountants or
psychologists as their partners in devising such methods.
Lawyers-through bar associations and as judges in state supreme
courts-have put in place elements of the secondary legal
infrastructure that ensure that they are in the primary position for any
development of legal methods and inputs. They have established
themselves as gatekeepers for innovation. It is in this sense that our
prohibiting the sharing of fees with non-lawyers or submission of legal work to non-lawyer
control or supervision. Australia and New Zealand were the first jurisdictions to eliminate
this requirement; the U.K. is implementing this reform now. For a discussion, see Milton C.
Regan, Jr. Lawyers, Symbols and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 PENN. ST.
INT'L L. REV. 407 (2008).
n7 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 20-23.
us See, e.g., In re Reynoso, 315 B.R. 544 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (solicitation of information
which is then translated into complete bankruptcy forms is unauthorized practice of law);
Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 91 Wash. 2d 48, 55
(selection and completion of preprinted form legal documents by nonlawyer is
unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Assn'n v. Northouse 848 N.E.2d
668 (Ind. 2006) (nonlawyer insurance agent and nonlawyer preparer of estate planning
documents engaged in unauthorized practice of law). For a recent challenge to online legal
document providers, see recently filed class action Todd Janson v. LegalZoom, 271 F.R.D.
506 (W.D. Mo.).
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secondary legal infrastructure-committed to public and closed
production methods in general-significantly constrains the potential
for innovation in our primary legal infrastructure.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD: A GREATER ROLE FOR
MARKETS IN THE PRODUCTION OF LEGAL INPUTS
The transformations in legal demand wrought by the attributes of
a new globally networked web-based economy-facing high degrees of
heterogeneity, high velocity and pervasive uncertainty-are clearly
outstripping the capacity of our legal infrastructure to keep pace. The
gaps and frictions and missing bridges identified by general counsel in
leading innovative firms reflect the growing inadequacy of the set of
legal inputs available to them to structure and regulate their economic
relationships and environment. The primary legal infrastructure
available to them is excessively document-based and human-capital
intensive; and insufficiently diversified, flexible, and responsive to
change and cost. That primary legal infrastructure is the organic
product of a set of rules and practices governing the production
processes of law-and it is at this secondary level of infrastructure that
efforts to improve the quality of law must aim.
Those production processes cause law to grow in ways that are
especially insensitive to the marginal costs and benefits of alternative
means of accomplishing specific economic tasks such as controlling
opportunism in a contracting relationship or encouraging investment
in appropriable assets such as new ideas. The reason, I claim, is that
public and highly protected providers dominate our production
processes for law-not subject to the competitive benefits of markets.
In the high velocity, high novelty, high complexity world of the new
economy, those benefits are principally the innovation benefits that
come from directing attention, effort, and resources to what is
happening on the margin-where costs are coming from, where
benefits are hidden, and how to creatively bring them into better
alignment using methods and techniques measured against
performance rather than the internal scholastic or adversarial values
of a closed legal profession.
A greater role for markets in the production processes of law
implies two key areas of reform. First, greater scope for competitive
private production of legal rules. This requires that economic entities
be given the ability to choose among legal providers, and that these
legal providers include private firms and organizations. We already
have the necessary enabling law that allows, for example, firms to
choose their state of incorporation; and the idea that companies might
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choose their securities regulator is now widely canvassed."> Obtaining
a greater role for markets in these settings merely requires expanding
the choice set to include private providers. Extending choice into other
legal areas certainly raises challenges-how to ensure that a market
for alternative forms of intellectual property protection operates
reasonably well if there is the risk that either users or producers of
appropriable knowledge dominate the market, for example. But these
are better challenges to undertake than to figure out how to get a slow-
moving and politically-expedient Congress to solve the problem with
ooo pages of legislation, how to get solutions out of million-dollar
lawsuits in front of juries and generalist judges applying scholastic
reasoning and responding to adversarial pressures.
The fact that we have much less market-based private production
of legal rules and systems than we already could have given the
potential for private contracting and the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, however, should alert us to the critical role in shaping
legal production played by our extraordinarily closed markets for legal
goods and services. This is why serious reform of our secondary legal
infrastructure aimed at improving the quality of legal inputs available
to the new economy also requires opening up the existing markets for
private legal providers. State-by-state lawyer (including judge) control
of who may provide legal services, in what form of organization, with
what training, and with what kind of financial and management
structure, erects a significant roadblock to the effort to drive
innovation in legal production. We need more people who are
thinking about how to deploy data to manage inchoate rapidly
changing economic relationships, not more people thinking about how
to draft more documents, to achieve that goal. We need more
resources devoted to optimizing value-distribution in order to
encourage investments in appropriable knowledge assets, not more
resources devoted to developing expensive document management
technology to respond to the e-discovery arms race in patent
litigation. We need the kind of creativity that develops simple elegant
user-interfaces for complex machines like the iPhone, not the kind of
Rube Goldberg creativity that ratchets up the ambiguity and hence
interpretive complexity of a contract or regulation. But our existing
119 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEOR.
INQUIRIES IN LAW 387 (2001); Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in
International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 Bus. LAw. 653
(2001).
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providers operate within a closed system that rewards excellence in
the deployment of scholastic and adversarial instruments, not the
invention of alternatives to them.
Only lawyers will find anything remarkable in the proposal that
markets for legal goods and services should operate as most other
markets do, with decisions about who can provide what goods and
services where, with what training, in what organizational form and
with what financing left largely to the market, subject only to the level
of regulation necessary to make such a market reasonably competitive
and responsive to social welfare. Lawyers will argue these are matters
of professional ethics-but they are not. They will argue these are
matters of consumer protection-but they are not. They are matters of
economic policy. And, as one of the general counsel I spoke to
remarked to me, law is too important to be left to lawyers. The
stunning transformation we are witnessing in the economy and global
economic relationships cannot be managed by the legal production
methods of the old economy. It requires nothing less than a
transformation of our legal infrastructure itself.
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